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The fratnework for financial services provision in a country includes laws governing financial
institutions, the deposit insurance law  (if  an  explicit deposit insurance scheme exists), securities
markets'  laws  and  regulations,  and  other  regulations  and  agreements,  including  those  of  an
international nature.  Among  others, these laws and regulations define the  role and activities of
deposit-taking financial institutions (banks) relative to non-bank financial institutions, influence the
degree of competition in the financial system (through the setting of minimum capital requirements,
and the definition of degrees and modes of permissible entry), define in a significant way the incentive
framework under which financial intermnediation  takes place, and provide for the necessary formal
enforcement and exit rules.  Ultimately, this framework and the way it is enforced determines to a
large degree the structure, stability and efficiency of a country's financial system.
This  paper  reviews  from  an  economic  perspective, and  relying  on  country  experiences,
alternative frarneworks for financial service provision.  In particular, it analyzes the costs and benefits
of different configurations of permissible activities for financial institutions, the effects of different
degrees of competition, and contestability in the financial sector, the design of a proper safety net, and
more generally lessons on the design of the framework for financial services  provision.
Regarding the scope of permissible activities, the analysis suggests that the integrated banking
model (i.e., full integration of commercial banking with other financial services, including securities
markets) can offer important benefits to both financial institutions-through  the potential of exploiting
economies of scale and scope, diversification of revenue generation, informational advantages that
increase the franchise value of financial institutions-and  to consumers-through  reduction of search
and transaction costs, and lower cost of financial services. Potential costs of more integrated financial
services provision-in  particular the extension of the  safety net to  non-deposit financial services
activities-can  be  mitigated,  through  appropriate safeguards  and  fire-walls,  which  do  require
enforcement of  regulation  and  proper  monitoring by  the  supervisory authority.  Internationally,
countries are already moving to more integrated financial services provision and most countries now
allow banks to engage in securities underwriting, dealing, and brokering.  Furthermore, in countries
where banks have more latitude to choose which corporate structure to adopt (i.e., where to locate the
securities unit), most banks choose to  locate it in a  department of the bank, thereby adopting the
integrated bank model.  There is also evidence that a wider scope of financial services provision
enhances financial stability and mitigates the risks of a banking crisis.
The analysis further highlights that competition in the financial sector can not be analyzed in
isolation.  The optimal degree of competition requires balancing various concerns including franchise
value, static and dynamic efficiency, ability to supervise a number of individual financial institutions,
and the scope and institutional context for rent seeking in the country. Country experience, and theory
more generally, suggests that competitiveness does not necessarily require many financial institutions
as a concentrated system can be competitive if contestable (i.e., open to competition).  The degree of
contestable entry in  the financial sector, together with  competition from  other forms of financial
intermediation, has  been an important determinant of the performance and  efficiency of financial
sectors. Openness to foreign banks is an important element in determining the degree of contestability.
While liberal entry to foreign banks lowers the franchise value of (domestic) institutions, evidence
suggests that on balance foreign entry provides important benefits to a country. A degree of foreignii
participation in the financial sector tends to improve the functioning of domestic financial institutions,
puts additional pressure on  domestic firms to  improve their productivity and  services, can foster
innovation and X-efficiency and allows domestic financial institutions access to foreign technologies
and know-how which  help raise efficiency.  Finally, cross-country experience does indicate that
systems should not  be  "over"  competitive, but  should allow for  adequate franchise value as  the
existence of future profits will provide incentives for financial institutions to  behave in a prudent
manner.
As theoretical and empirical analysis has long recognized, there is a tradeoff between assuring
safety and soundness of financial institutions and fostering an efficient allocation of resources.  The
design of the overall safety net is the most important factor in this tradeoff.  A well functioning safety
net minimizes regulatory forbearance and provides incentives for banks to  act prudently, thereby
promoting systemic solvency.  The scope of the  safety net will be  defined by a  combination of
elements, including among others, lender of last resort facilities, explicit or implicit deposit insurance
schemes, the access of financial institutions to the payment system, the prevailing regulatory norms
and their enforcement, and importantly, the rules for intervention in weak and the resolution process of
failed financial institutions.
While some form of safety net is unavoidable, it can create large moral hazard, as many country
experiences attest,  particularly  through  explicit  and  implicit  deposit  insurance.  Cross-country
experience shows that the expectation of ex-post recapitalization using government resources has been
an important element of safety nets  inducing imprudent behavior.  Arrangements to reduce these
include most importantly a proper regulatory and enforcement framework, especially regarding the
capital adequacy of financial institutions. To ensure proper supervision and regulation, the supervisory
authority should be free from political pressure.  These arrangements can also include an explicit
deposit insurance scheme, but this needs to be complemented  with specific actions, including clear exit
rules and other design criteria (for example, risk sensitive premia).
There is less clarity on a preferred institutional design for the supervisory functions.  Cross-
country experience shows that countries have adopted different institutional structures depending on
the objectives of regulations and the type of regulatory approach taken (single vs. multiple agency).
Nevertheless, best international practice suggests that the supervision of the financial conglomerate
should be performed on a consolidated basis.
More generally, the costs of the safety net can be  minimized and efficiency and robustness
enhanced if financial institutions operate in an overall regulatory and incentive framework which is
incentive compatible with prudent banking.  This incentive framework includes the regulatory and
supervisory framework, accounting rules and practices, disclosure requirements, and the existence of a
deposit insurance scheme.  Owners of financial institutions will behave more prudently if they have
much at risk-in  the form of capital, future expected profits, or their own jobs.  In the same vein, large
deposit holders tend to provide market discipline if they are not covered by any implicit or explicit
deposit insurance scheme and if extensive disclosure requirements exist and the accounting framework
is adequate. Finally, supervisors need to have the incentives both to monitor and to take actions based
on this effort, which requires that pay and conditions for supervisors should be sufficient to attract and
retain competent and  motivated staff.  In practice that means closing the gap that usually exists
between the pay of regulators and that of private bankers.iii
The paper is  organized as  follows.  Section II  examines alternative structures of  financial
services provision, often not determined by competition but rather by law and regulations. 'It discusses
the advantages and disadvantages of integrated banking and other structures.  Section III focuses on
the role  of competition  in  the  financial sector, the  instruments governments can use to  manage
competition  and  the  level  of  franchise  value  in  a  banking system,  and  the  tradeoffs between
competition on the one hand and safety, soundness and innovations considerations on the other hand.
Section IV analyzes the main motivations and components of the safety net, the tradeoff between the
scope of a safety net on the one hand and the effects of financial sector efficiency on the other hand.  It
discusses alternative design features for the safety net, particularly regarding deposit insurance, and the
essential pre-requisites for effective supervision.  Beyond the basic infrastructure, the behaviors of the
actors in the financial system depend crucially on the incentives they face.  The concluding Section V
therefore discusses some of the latest thinking on the design of an incentive compatible regulatory
system, that is a system which encourages prudent behavior and efficient financial intermediation.I
II.  Determining the Scope of Permissible Activities of Financial Institutions
*  This section focuses, from an economic perspective, on the advantages and disadvantages of
integrated banking and the various corporate structures  under which banking can be conducted. It
examines the following questions:
*  How does the scope of permissible activities of financial institutions differ across countries?
*  What impact do different configuration of permissible activities have on financial institutions'
franchise value or what are the gains and risks from allowing broader banking powers?
*  What are the costs and benefits of allowing banks to engage in commercial and investment
banking, and to have ownership stake in non-financial institutions?
*  What types of corporate structures are used for banking organizations  and what are their respective
benefits and costs?
*  How do non-bank financial institutions relate to the rest of the financial system?
1.  Introduction - the Structure of Financial Services Provision
In most countries, regulation rather than competition determines a bank's range of  products and
services it can offer, the types of assets and liabilities it can hold and issue, and the legal structure of its
organization.  Regulators  in  countries have  allowed  for  different  configurations of  pennissible
activities certain types of financial institutions can undertake and for different types of organizational
structures. Two models at the opposite end of the spectrum are a separate financial system, where
banks are not allowed to engage in any type of securities or other, non-credit financial service activity,
and a completely integrated system, where banks can provide all types of financial services, either
directly or indirectly through subsidiaries with involvement in management.  The latter is often called
"  universal banking".  As there are other aspects often associated with universal banking--such as the
ownership of non-financial institutions (that will be discussed in the next section)-we  rather use the
term "integrated banking" to refer to a wide scope of financial services provision within a  single
institution.
Out  of 51  industrialized  and  emerging countries surveyed by  the Institute  of International
Bankers in 1998, only China has a "pure" separate banking system (in the sense that banks are not
allowed to  engage in  any type of securities activities).  The majority (36) of countries surveyed,
including all EU-countries, allow integrated banking, i.e., banks are allowed to conduct both banking
and securities business (including underwriting, dealing and brokering all kinds of securities) within
the same banking organization. Finally, in 15 countries, financial institutions are allowed to engage in
securities activities (to a varying degree), either through a bank parent (12) or a bank-holding company
structure (3).  The US is the most prominent country with a bank holding company structure which
also has quite restrictive regulations on securities businesses which can be undertaken  by comrnmercial
banks (see further Annex Table 1 and 2).1
Historically, that is before the late  19th  century/early 20th  century, the range of products and
services individual  financial institutions  have offered (i.e., the  scope  of  their  financial services
provision) has  in  many  countries been determined by market  forces.  Competition, comparative
1  According to Section 20 of  the U.S. Bank Holding Company Act, revenues that  commercial banks derive from their  securities
subsidiary (underwriting and dealing activities) are restricted to less than 25 percent of their overall profits.  Moreover, commercial
banks are not allowed to hold an equity stake in non-financial firms (except for trading purposes).2
advantage, relative supply of skilled professionals, and other factors determined whether banks would
provide a broad or narrow range of financial services.  Choices made by financial institutions most
often had no  adverse consequences on  either financial stability, efficiency or access to  financial
services.  Over time, however, countries introduced restrictions on the type of activities of different
financial institutions. 2 The  motives  for  the restrictions,  however, not  necessarily  economic or
financial, but often came into play for political reasons.  From an economic analysis point of view, it
would thus be most natural to first ask the question whether there is a case for restrictions to begin
with and then analyze what the consequent opportunity costs are of a particular restriction. Since most
countries have restrictions, however, we rather analyze the gains from removing (some of) these
restrictions and the risks which need to be taken into account when doing so.
The rationales for not allowing financial institutions full freedom in choosing the scope of their
activities have been twofold : (i) potential conflicts of interest, and (ii) risks of financial instability. 3
Benefits from allowing a  wider scope of financial services provision which have been identified
include economies of scale and scope, and risk diversification. We discuss these benefits and costs in
the next two sections (the costs and benefits of integrated banking are summarized in  Table 1).
Important background to  this  discussion is the  global trend of  increased substitutability between
various types of financial instruments in terms of providing similar kind of services.  Bank deposits,
for example, compete now in many countries with other liabilities of financial intermediaries, such as
money market funds, in the provision of liquidity and payment services.  This has implied, on one
hand, that the demarcation lines between different types of financial intermediaries have become
increasingly blurred from the consumer and producer point of view.  On the other hand, the economic
costs of maintaining regulatory barriers have risen as these barriers have become less effective, but still
impose costs on individual financial institutions.
2.  Benefits of a Wider Scope of Financial Services Provision
Three reasons have been identified why allowing for a wide scope of financial services provision
("fully integrated banking") can increase the franchise value and market value of banks: it allows for
the use of informational advanta es, it increases profits (through economies of scale and scope), and it
reduces the variability of profits.
2 It is useful to compare in this respect the American banking system prior to World War I to that of Germany, a period for both countries
of  large-scale industrialization  (see  further Calomiris,  1996). German commercial banks provided then  (and largely still  do) an
unrestricted range of services, including lending, underwriting, trusts  services and deposit taking.  The American banking system.
traditionally heavily regulated, was importantly shaped by restrictions on branching and consolidation dating from the I9'h century and
focussed on financing commerce, rather than industrial firms (the latter became financed by investment banks).  The Great Depression in
the US further added to restrictions.  The motives for the restrictions in the US were, however, not necessarily based on economic or
financial problems.  Rather, these restrictions emerged on fears of excessive concentration of power, desire to keep savings locally, and
concerns to protect individual states' rights.
3 Another concern has been the concentratio;n  of economic power that may come along with commercial banks having a wider scope of
activities, including owning non-financial institutions. This has been a highly charged, political economy issue, and some countries care
more about 'excessive' concentration than others.  This issue relates probably more to the concentration of economic power in general,
including  that of non-financial institutions, and the degree of competition, rather than to the particular banking model adopted.
4 The question of scope of financial services is related to the costs and benefits of bank-based versus capital market-based systems, which
in turn may have implications on firms' access and cost of capital and economic growth.  For an overview of this literature, see Stulz,
1999.3
Informational  Advantages
In establishing a relationship with a firm, a bank incurs costs in gathering information about the
firm and  its  investment opportunity before making lending decisions.  The longer the expected
duration of the bank-firm relationship, the more willing the bank will be to invest in gatlhering  firm-
specific informnation,  which  in  turn  can increase the  financing to  valuable investment projects. 5
Integrated banks have some advantages over specialized banks in this respect as they can offer a
broader set of financial products than specialized banks. This allows an integrated bank to learn more
about its borrowers and to lower infonnation and monitoring costs.  Information derived, for example,
from managing a basic bank account can be used in the supply of other financial services. As if the
banks holds an equity ownership, it may have a representation on the board of directors and thus gain
infornation  which can be useful for its lending activities.  A broader set of services also allows an
integrated bank to design financing contracts better suited to the borrower and have more leverage
over firms' managerial discretion. Finally, as a firm switches from bank financing to raising money on
the capital markets, the firm can continue to be a customer of the same bank if the bank provides both
lending and securities underwriting services.
Empirical research on the importance of these benefits is still in its early stages. Preliminary
findings, however, seem to  confirm that the close bank-firm relationship associated with integrated
banking can be a source of important benefits to firms in terms of cost and availability of funding
(Berger and Udell 1995; Petersen and Rajan 1994; Vander Vennet 1999). Essentially, informational
advantages associated with  integrated banking can turn  advantages for banks into advantages for
customers as they  get better  (and  cheaper) services.  The degree to  which these inforrnational
advantages  can  be  realized  and  passed  on  depends  of  course  on  the  degree  of  informational
asymmetries: in economies where information is generally poor, close bank-firm relationships could in
principle be very useful.  At the same time, weak information on financial institutions may mean that
close bank-firm relationship suffer from poor resource allocation due to the weak monitoring of banks
themselves. The balance between these two effects will, among others, be influenced by the degree of
competition in the financial sector (see further section III).
Economies of Scope and Scale
Economies of scope may arise both from the production of financial services and from their
consumption.  On the production side, economies of  scope exist when the cost of orne institution
producing several products is less than the costs of several specialized firms producing the same
bundle of products.  Potential economies of scope arise whenever a significant fixed cost (information
acquisition, staff,  reputation, distribution  facilities)  can  be  shared  across  products  and  services
(Baumol, Panzar and Willig 1981). Economies of scope on the product side arise from various factors
related to  inforrnational access, distribution economies (Llewellyn 1996), and  access to  funding.
Several forms of cost advantages have been identified (Saunders 1996):
5 Firms  generally  have  information  about  their own creditworthiness  and about  relevant  features  of their investment  projects  that is not
readily  available  to outsiders  and/or can not credibly  be conveyed  to outsiders. The information  gap can in part be corrected  by
contracting  with an independent  agent  (rating  agency,  accounting  firm,  consulting  firm)  that  can credibly  convey  relevant  information  to
outsiders.  Not all  firms  are able  to reduce  the information  gap completely,  however,  and not  all information  can  be credibly  conveyed  by
third  parties. The  production  of information  may be too costly,  for example,  or it may require  a continuous  and extensive  relationship
with  third  parties. Financial  intermediaries,  especially  banks,  may  be able  to fill  some  of this gap.4
*  Information  access and managing the client relationship. Instead of assessing a corporation on a
separate  basis  for  each  finiancial transaction, an  integrated financial  institution  incurs  such
information cost  only  once.  If  fixed costs  in  managing the  client relationship (technology,
information bases, etc) can be shared between services, economies may be derived by offering
various financial products.
*  Distribution  and marketing  economies.  Technology and delivery channels established by the
bank can be used to supply a wide range of services.  Given the fixed costs of delivery systems,
there is potential for scope economies.  Several services can be marketed simultaneously, and the
bank may gain both a marketing advantage and a reputational advantage in offering a wide range
of services.
*  Reputational and pecuniary  capital.  As long as there are spillovers in reputation, an integrated
bank can use the reputation acquired in one business to enhance another.  To the extent that it is
easier to gain a reputation in some businesses than in others, and to the extent that there are fixed
costs in gathering reputation, there may be advantages for integrated banks.
*  Risk management.  To the extent that risks on alternative products or services are not perfectly
correlated, economies in risk management can be secured within a diversified portfolio of services
and products  (see further below). Moreover, an  integrated bank that combines asset-intensive,
lending business and fee-generating, securities business may be able to fund itself more easily than
specialized banks that focus on one or the other.
On the consumption side, economies of scope may derive from lower search costs and lower
product prices. These can include the following (Saunders 1996):
D  Potential for  lower search, information, monitoring and transaction costs.  The consumer may
feel more secure dealing with an institution with which it has already an ongoing relationship
through the provision of another financial services.
*  Potential for  negotiating  better deals.  A  wider relationship with  a  bank may  strengthen a
customer's position towards the bank and may enable him/her to negotiate better deals, either for
individual or for services.
*  Potential for  lower product prices in a competitive environment.  If a bank secures economies of
scope through  diversification, competitive markets should lead to  a  sharing of these benefits
between the bank and the consumer.
Empirical work on economies of scale and scope has been hampered in that separating inputs
from outputs  for financial institutions is difficult and the "noise" in  a  bank's  reported costs and
revenues may be considerable. In terms of economies of scale, most empirical studies have found that
the bulk of scale economies are captured, but not fully exhausted, by the time a bank has $2 to $10
billion in assets. Early studies for US banks found that economies of scale were exhausted at relatively
small output levels (see Clark 1988 for a review). More recently, studies including larger banks have
found evidence of scale economies up to the $ 2-10 billion asset range (Noulas, Ray and Miller 1990,
Hunter, Timme and  Yang  1990).  Other empirical evidence for US  banks actually suggests that
economies of scale may start to decline for asset sizes between $10 to $25 billion (Berger, Hunter, and
Timme 1993).  The few tests which have been conducted for other countries largely confirn these
results.  In a study based on non-US data, Saunders and Walter (1994), and Vander Vennet (1994) find
economies of scale in loans of up to $ 25 million. Lang and Wetzel (1995, 1996) find scale economies
among German universal banks up to a size of $ 5 billion. Evidence for emerging countries is limited.5
While there is some evidence on economies of scale, as of yet, there is little empirical evidence
of scope economies, possibly because financial institutions can not or do not choose their optimal
institutional structure. The bulk of studies for US banks concludes that economies of scope in banking,
if at all present, are exhausted at very low levels of output (Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey 1987;
Berger, Hunter and Timme 1993). Empirical studies on European banks have been inconclusive. For
example, Lang and Welzel (1995, 1996) report the absence of scope economies in Germran  universal
banks, but find such economies in small cooperative banks. Vander Vennet (1999) finds that universal
banks are characterized by significant higher levels of operational efficiency relative to specialized
banks and are also more profit efficient. Evidence for G-10 countries by Barth, Nolle and Rice (1997)
suggests that  loosening  restrictions  on  banking activities  might  enhance  bank  performance-as
statistically the return of equity is higher for banks in countries with no restrictions on securities and
banking activities-thus  suggesting some economies of scope. 6
Increased Diversification and Lower Risk
An  integrated bank  may  be more  stable than  a  specialized bank because  of diversification
benefits.  These benefits can arise from two sources.  First, dis-intermediation-when  firms bypass
banks and raise money directly from public markets-will  affect integrated banks less, because the
decline in their  lending business will be  offset by  an increase in  their underwriting and placing
business.  This in turn may reduce banks' incentives to engage in riskier lending to maintain profits
when faced with dis-intermediaton. Secondly, if profits from different financial services are not highly
correlated, then the total profits of an integrated bank will be more stable than that of banks specialized
in a single product.
A recent cross-country study found that countries where banks were restricted in their securities
and other non-credit activities, had a higher likelihood of experiencing a banking crisis (Barth, Caprio,
Levine  1998).  A  recent  study  for  the  US  found that,  while  banking organizations'  securities
subsidiaries  tend  to  be  riskier  (higher  volatility  of  profits)  than  banking  affiliates,  securities
subsidiaries provided diversification benefits to the bank holding company because of the low return
correlation between bank and securities subsidiaries (Kwan 1997).
3.  Potential Risks Associated with Integrated Banking
Integrated banking can have risks due to too close links between banks and enterprises (John,
John and  Saunders  1994; Berlin  and  Saunders 1993).  These risks include  conflicts of interest,
increased financial risks, and greater difficulty in monitoring integrated banks. 7
Conflicts of Interest
Conflicts of interest are one of the major potential costs of permitting commercial banks to
conduct securities business.8 As a consequence of the often long-term lending relationship between a
6 For a further overview of the different empirical studies see Vander Vennet (1995).
7An  integrated banking system may also lead to greater market concentration and thus has the potential to reduce competition. This will
be discussed in Section 111.
8 See further Edwards (1979), Saunders (1985), Kelly (1985) and Benston (1990).6
bank and a client firm, the bank is better informed than the public investor about a firm's soundness
and prospects.  This informational advantage may, however, be a double-edged sword. On the positive
side, an integrated bank might be better positioned than an specialized investment bank to certify
credibly the value of a security offered by the firm.  On the negative side, an integrated banks might
have a greater incentive and greater ability to take advantage of investors. Banks might abuse the trust
of their customers and sell low quality securities to them without revealing risks, or raise lending rates
to  the same borrowers. Conflicts of interest concerns are important in the  context of  the banks'
proprietary activities (i. e. when the bank acts on its own account), they are of less importance when
the bank acts as an agent.
Empirical  studies  for the  German (universal) banking system and  for the US  (pre-  Glass-
Steagall) have not found any evidence of abusive practices by commercial banks.  Two extensive
studies commissioned by the Germnan  government in the 1970s (Bueschgen 1970, Gessler Commission
1979)  did not find substantial empirical support that banks were using their informational advantage on
firms to the disadvantage of securities investors. For the US (pre-Glass-Steagall),  if commercial  banks
had abused their informational advantages and sold low quality securities to investors than one would
expect securities underwritten by comnmercial  banks to  have performed worse ex-post than similar
securities underwritten by investment banks.  This is, however, not the case.  A study found that
securities underwritten by commercial banks performed better than similar securities underwritten by
investment banks (Kroszner and Rajan 1994). Their findings confirmed results of Ang and Richardson
(1994) and Puri (1994).
Safety and Soundness and the Safety Net
A combination of securities and commercial banking activities can increase the risk of bank
failure (for a more extensive discussion of these issues, see Saunders 1994).  While this has at times
happened in emerging markets as well as developed countries (e.g., Barings), empirical evidence does
not confirm this possibility as a general proposition.  An empirical analysis of bank failures in the
1920s in the US for example found that banks undertaking securities activities were no more likely to
fail than banks with no connection to the securities business (White 1986). More generally, there is no
strong evidence that the combination of financial activities increases risk, and they might well reduce
risks.  For example, Wall and Eisenbeis (1984), using accounting data at the industry level, find that
there was a negative correlation between bank earnings and securities broker/dealer earnings over the
1970 to 1980s period. 9
Nevertheless, safeguards can be necessary to avoid the transfer of explicit and implicit deposit
insurance subsidies from the banking part of the institution to the securities part (Kane (1996) and
Schwartz (1992) discuss in details how these transfers can occur). These safe-guards can take the form
of  market  value  accounting,  timely  monitoring  and  disclosure,  more  risk-sensitive  capital
requirements,  firewalls  between  different  type  of  operations,  strong  prompt  corrective  action
procedures, including the closure of insolvent banks, and risk-based pricing of deposit insurance.
9 For a review of this literature see Brewer, Fortier, and Pavel (1989) and Benston (1990).7
Monitoring and Supervision
Supervision of commercial banks and securities entities aims at different objectives. Supervision
of commercial banks is aimed at systemic stability by protecting the net worth of the entity (and thus
the rights of creditors, particularly depositors) as primary the bank will be intermediating third party
money.  In securities finns, regulators' objective is aimed at consumer protection.  Regulations are
geared to safeguard the investment made by investors through these firms: as long as investors can
recover the assets they have invested in, insolvency of a securities firms does not need to present a
systemic risk.  Therefore, from a systemic stability point of view, supervisors would want to monitor
the risks that arise from integrated banking as they relate to the safety net (above).
The combination of  securities and commercial banking activities can make supervision and
monitoring by the market of integrated banks more difficult as the securities business might have an
impact on the banking business while the two activities can not easily be monitored separately.8
Table 1: Overview of Benefits and Costs of Integrated  Banking
Specific  benefits/costs  Empirical  Evidence/Comments
Potential  Benefits:
Informational  *  A bank can obtain more information about the firm via  *  Some preliminary empirical findings
Advantages  its various products offered;  confirm that enhancement of a bank-firm
*  Banks and firms have the possibility of developing a  relationship is a source of important
longer term relationship which may result in improved  benefits in terms of cost and availability
access to bank financing and better financing condition  of funding.
for the borrower.
Economies of Scope  Cost economies derived from:  *  Empirical evidence inconclusive
*  Information access;  *  But there a revealed preference of
*  Management of client relationship;  financial institutions world-wide (e.g.,
*  Distribution economies;  Europe, US) to move toward integrated
*  Marketing economies;  financial services provision
*  Reputational and Pecuniary Capital Economies;
*  Risk Management.
Economies on the consumer side:
*  Potential for lower search, information,  monitoring and
transaction cost;
*  Potential for negotiating better deals;
*  Potential for lower product prices in a competitive
environment;
Economies of Scale  *  Exploitation of scale economies from overhead in  *  Empirical evidence for the US suggests
administration, back office operation, information  that the bulk of scale economies are
technology anid  investment banking type operations;  captured by banks with $100 to 200
*  Size may also help in exploiting scope economies;  million in assets;
*  Additional scale economies perhaps
achievable up to $1 billion.
*  Global trend toward consolidation
suggests economies of scale
Risk Diversification  *  Provides banks with higher profits in periods of disinter-  *  Some empirical evidence on benefits of
mediation.  risk diversification.
*  More stable income streams.
Increase in Revenue  *  Cross-selling of different services and products should  *  No know empirical studies on this
Generation  allow banks to increase revenues.  question.
.
Potential  Costs:
Conflicts of Interest  *  Banks might abuse the trust of their customers by selling  *  Empirical studies in the US and Germany
low quality securities to them without revealing risks.  have not found evidence of conflicts  of
interests that disadvantaged
investors/customers.9
Specific benefits/costs  Empirical Evidence,Comments
Potential Costs:
Reduction in  *  Integrated banking may reduce the scope for  *  There may be a trade-off between safety
Competition  competition;  and soundness considerations  (higher
franchise value of integrated  banks) and a
reduction in competition. A liberal entry
policy may be able to counterweigh  this
disadvantage  to a certain degree. Yet from
a political economy point of view, it may
be difficult to sustain a liberal entry policy
if economic power (i. e. the banking
system) is concentrated.
Concentration of  *  Integrated banking may more likely lead to a  *  No specific evidence.
Economic and  concentration of economic and hence political power.
Political Power
Monitoring  *  More difficult to supervise.  *  Some theoretical literature suggests more
*  More difficult for the market to monitor.  difficulty to supervise and worse
corporate governance of integrated
financial institutions.
Expansion of Safety  *  Safety net of deposit taking institutions may be extended  *  Can be limited with policy-measures  such
Net  to investment banking activities of banks.  as market value accounting,  risk sensitive
insurance premia, and capital
requirements and by adopting prompt
corrective action procedures.
4.  The Corporate Structure of Banking Organizationsio
The extent to which the potential benefits of integrated banking can be realized depends largely
on the organizational model banks are pernitted to adopt for their commercial banking and securities
activities.  Three models can be distinguished: (i) the fully-integrated banking model; (ii) the bank-
parent model; and (iii) the holding company model. A fourth corporate structure is one that forces the
complete institutional separation between commercial and investment banking, the separate banking
system model.
Integrated Banking Model
In countries where banks have the latitude to choose which corporate structure to adopt, most
banks choose to locate the securities unit in a department of the bank, thereby adopting the integrated
bank model (see also Annex Table 1). l  Under the integrated banking model both commercial banking
'° See for a more extensive discussion: Santos (1997).
l  There are, however, exceptions.  In the UK, for example, securities markets' business is permitted in banks, but usually conducted
through subsidiaries.  Moreover, it should be noted that separation between legal entities can be overcome in practice: a separate legal
entity can be set up to work actually as a department of the bank (with cost sharing for information technology or support functions for
instances). Finally, consolidation of accounts of separate entities can achieve the same level of risk diversification berLefits  and increase
the sources of revenues.  Many banks in the US for example avail themselves of these options as they face legal linmits  to integration.10
and securities activities are conducted within a single corporate entity.  As a result, the integration of
activities can be achieved at the lowest cost and resources can be shared among the organization's
various departments with maximum flexibility allowing the bank to realize informational advantages
and economies of scope and scale.  Moreover, it increases banks'  ability to diversify its sources of
revenue. At the same time, safeguards for limiting conflicts of interest and extending the safety net are
limited (Santos 1997; Saunders 1994).12
The Bank-Parent Company Model
In the bank-parent model, the securities business is undertaken by a subsidiary of the bank.  As
there is a legal separation between the bank and the securities unit, integration of the two activities can
only partially be  achieved and  thus  compared to  the integrated banking model the potential for
economies of scope is reduced.  However, this  model still allows for risk diversification, and the
potential for higher revenues through cross-selling of financial services.  The bank-parent model can
reduce the potential for  conflicts of interest and the extension of the safety net to  the securities
operations of the bank-provided  regulations require firewalls between bank and its subsidiaries and
prescribe arms-length transactions.
The Holding Company Model
In this model a holding company owns both the bank and the securities subsidiary, with legal
separation between the two units, which limits the integration of commercial banking with securities
activities.  Different products  are offered by  separately capitalized and  incorporated units  of the
conglomerate with each unit having its own management team, its own accounting record, and its own
capital.  This generally limits  the exchange of information, personnel, or other inputs among the
conglomerate's various units, thus reducing economies of scale and scope and weakening the bank's
ability to exploit informational advantages synergies.  At the same time, the holding company can act
as a source of financial strength to the bank subsidiary.  Finally, the holding company structure can
limit risk diversification potential (as revenues generated by securities activities accrue to that unit and
then to the holding company).'3
An advantage of the bank holding company structure is that the potential for conflicts of interest
is reduced.  A further plus is that the extension of the safety net to the securities unit may be limited.
The critical difference between the integrated bank and holding company models is that in the latter
the securities subsidiary's capital is owned by the holding company, while in the former it is owned by
the bank itself.  The bank  unit is thus insulated to  a certain degree from the failure of securities
business  under  arms-length  transactions  and  firewalls  as  the  holding  company's  liability  is
(theoretically) limited to its investment (capital) (see further Santos 1997).
These choices do, however, impose costs on the financial institution as these corporate structures may not necessarily coincide with the
individual bank's preferred choice of corporate structure.
12 Helfer (1997), Greenspan (1997), and Whalen (1996) discuss in detail the existence of a safety net subsidy through integrated  banking.
'3  Here the diversification gains are achieved at the holding company level and the holding company can also act as a source of strength
to the bank subsidiary.I1
Table 2:  Potential Benefits and Costs of Integrated Banking Can Be Realized throughl  Various
Corporate Structures
Potential  integrated  Ban king  Bank-Parent  Model  Haoldng  Company  Model  Separate  Banking
Benefits/Costs  Model  System
Informational  Can be realized to  May  be  reduced  if  bank-  Severely  reduced  as  units  are  None.
Advantage  full extent.  parent  do  not  share  restricted  from  exchange  of
information;  infornation.
Economies of scale  Can  be  realized  to  Somewhat  reduced  as  Reduced  as  operational  None.
and scope  full extent.  operational separateness is  separateness  requires
introduced  and  activities  development and  operation of
are not fully integrated.  separate units; moreover holding
company  increases  costs  of
operation.
Diversification of  Can be realized to  As profits accrue to the  Limited as  revenues  generated  None.
sources of revenue  full extent.  bank, revenue  by securities activities accrue to
diversification can be  that unit.
realized at bank level.
Increase of revenue  Can be fully  Can only be realized to  Limited.  None.
generation through  realized.  extent that bank can use its
cross-selling of  outlets to cross-sell
products  products;
Reduction in  Potentially.  Potentially.  Potentially.  No.
competition:
Conflicts of interest  Limited safeguards.  Potential  reduction  in  Potential reduction in conflicts  No potential.
conflicts of interest.  of interest.
Extension of  Limited safeguards.  Dependent on existence of  Bank  unit  is  insulated  to  a  Govemnment safety
govemment safety net  firewalls and requirements  certain  degree from  failure  of  net limited to "pure"
for  arms-length  securities business and holding  deposit  taking
transactions.  company is limited as to extent  institutions.
of capital infusion it can provide
to securities  subsidiary.__________
5.  The Role of Non-Bank  Financial  Institutions
Most corporations engage  in  some financial activities.  These can involve trade financing,
provisions of working capital, consumer finance, and other forms of financing. Most countries do not
subject these types  of financial activities to prudential regulation and  supervision as  long as the
corporation does not take any deposit from the general public, but rather funds itself in wholesale and
other markets where there are well-qualified and informed investors. Leasing companies, for example,
are generally not regulated from a prudential point of view.  Nor are corporations extending credit to
their  customers supervised.  This  can  work satisfactorily, provided that  financial information is
abundant and properly disclosed, and the corporations engaging in the provision of financial services
are properly governed and monitored.  However, most countries do regulate some of the activities of
these companies from a consumer protection and market-integrity point of view.  Leasing companies
and credit card corporations, for example, will typically have to satisfy certain disclosure rules to the
consumer on each lease or credit.12
There is a legitimate role for non-regulated, non-bank financial institutions, including finance
companies. Most governments exert less oversight over non-bank financial intermediaries since these
organizations do not directly participate in the payments system or are covered by deposit insurance.
Nevertheless, there have been cases were failures of non-bank banking organization have led to an
extension of the official safety net because authorities were concerned about systemic repercussions.
Moreover, banks may  engage in regulatory arbitrage (if  non-banks deposit- or deposit substitute
institutions face less stringent capital to asset regulations) and conduct their "riskier" business through
these entities. 14 Several financial crises, such as in East Asia and Japan, begun outside the commercial
banking sector, but then spread to banks. Thus, some regulation and supervision of non-banks can be
important. But, is important to distinguish different causes for concern.
Concerns often arise from the difficulty in distinguishing the functions of normal commercial
banks from those performed by the type of non-bank financial institutions; in many countries, non-
bank financial institutions emerged as a response to regulatory restrictions on commercial banks or
banking activities.  As a result the distinction between deposit-taking banks and these types of non-
bank financial institutions may have become blurred in the eyes of the public and the authorities may
consequently feel compelled to extend the safety net in case of financial uncertainty. Since the general
motivation for the safety net is based on systemic consequences and degree of vulnerability to runs, it
should be limited to deposit taking financial institutions. This in turn requires that there is a clear legal
separation between deposit-taking financial institutions and other type of non-banking, non-deposit-
taking financial institutions ancd  that any deposit-taking financial institution is subject to  the same
prudential  regulation  and  supervision  as  banking  institutions.  Regardless,  "non-bank" financial
institutions that take any  type of deposits or deposit substitutes and make loans should be either
subjected to banking regulation or forced to drop one of these activities, such as by converting to
mutual fund status. Non-banks may be active in securities markets, in which case they will be covered
by securities market legislation. or by the industry standards or regulations given the function they
performn  (e.g., insurance, contractual savings, etc.).
III.  Competition/Contestability
The following subsection focuses on the role of competition in the financial sector and the
tradeoffs between competition on one hand and safety, soundness and innovations considerations on
the other hand.  In particular it focused on the following questions:
*  What is the preferred degree of competition in the financial sector?
*  What instruments can be used to manage the degree of competition?
*  What will the current process of consolidation in the financial sector globally mean for
competitiveness and efficiency?
*  What are the specific benefits and costs of foreign entry?
*  What is the best framework for licensing new financial institutions?
14 Thailand is one recent experience where non-banks, i.e., finance companies, engage in riskier activities as they faced higher funding
cost against the background of lower capital requirements.13
1.  Introduction
The issue of competition in the financial sector can not be looked upon in isolation, different
perhaps from other sectors where unfettered competition is often the first best from efficiency, stability
and growth perspectives.  In the financial sector, the degree of competition requires balancing, among
others, the following concerns: (i) franchise value, (ii) static and dynamic efficiency, (iii) ability to
supervise a number of individual financial institutions, and (iv) rent-seeking. 1 s
2.  Instruments to Manage Competition and Influence the Level of Franchise Value
Cross-country experiences and theory show that there is a tradeoff between competition and
safety and soundness considerations.  Systems should not be "over"-competitive, that is, there needs to
be adequate profitability for financial institutions, that is franchise value, in the system as the existence
of future profits will help induce financial institutions to act prudently now.  It has been found, for
example, that the Mexican banking system after the large-scale privatization of 1991-2 was over-
competitive (Gruben and McComb,  1996).  Marginal costs exceeded marginal revenue during the
1992-1994, thus weakening capital positions and increasing incentives for risk-taking of banks, and
thereby contributing to the financial instability resulting in the 1994/5 crisis.
Cross-country experience, and theory more generally, suggests that entry policies (not actual
entry) matter most in determining the level of competition in a banking system (Vives, 1998). Next
important is the degree of competition from all forms of financial intermediation (banking and non-
banking) and through other forms of external finance. A competitive financial system thus does not
necessarily  require  many  financial  institutions.  A  concentrated  system  can  be  competitive if
contestable (it  should  be  noted  that  contestability alone is  not  necessarily  sufficient to  achieve
competition).' 6 Many European, the Canadian and other countries financial systems are considered
quite competitive, yet they have a limited number of banks.  But, competition from other financial
institutions and through other forms of financial intermediation is strong in these markets. Moreover,
financial institutions in these markets are faced with a credible threat of new entry as entry is allowed,
subject to certain conditions, and the licensing process is a transparent one.
While entry policies are one important instrument to achieve the desired level of franchise
value/competition and assure other safety and soundness objectives, using entry barriers alone to
manage the level of competition can have important negative drawbacks (see Hon.ohan  and Stiglitz
1999). Specifically, limited entry may come with: (i) large rent-seeking; (ii) limited iincentives  for cost
reduction and other efficiency improvements; and (iii) limited incentives for technological and other
innovations.  Moreover, entry has to be considered in relationship to exit. Inside ancd  outside investors
need to face the loss of their investment, and they and their managers need to see the possibility of
bank failure, or exit from the industry, to encourage efficient and prudent behavior.  Bank exit should
15 In many market-oriented economies, government restrictions upon economic activities give rise to rents (i. e., extra profits) of a variety
of forms and often people are willing to compete for the rents.  The term rent seeking describes the fact that economic agents are willing
to put efforts into securing a monopoly or other government restrictions on market activities (as, for example, minimum or maximum
prices).  This rent seeking behavior absorbs large resources, redistributes wealth and imposes social costs.  Ceilings on lending interest
rates and consequent credit rationing lead to competitions for loans and/or high-cost banking operations.  Some kinds of interest groups
are more readily organized than others and these will be in a more advantageous position to see their interests protected and monopolies
or other impediments to competition maintained.
16 Stiglitz (1987) has shown that potential competition may not be sufficient to discipline firms in an industry in the existence of sunk
costs (costs that once expended cannot be recovered).14
not be discouraged, especially not in the expansionary phase of the business cycle: not only will exit
then not have systemic implications, but it will also  serve to remind others that mistakes will be
punished.  Weak  banks  need  to  be  resolved-which  should  include  liquidating  non-viable
institutions-not  only to quickly restore financial intermediation, but also to preserve incentives for
prudent and efficient banking (see Section V).
Other instruments that countries have employed to manage competition and franchise value
are: (i) minimum capital requirements for existing and new financial institutions, (ii) capital adequacy
requirements (as a fraction of risk-weighted assets); (iii) ceilings on deposit rates; and (iv) limits on
portfolio composition or  lending  activities.  Each of  these instruments has  its  own side  effects,
including rent-seeking,  dis-intenrmediation,  monitoring  costs,  etc.  Most  countries have  used  a
combination of different tools  at different times.  The preferred combination depends on country
circumstances, important among which are the quality of financial information and supervision, the
complexity of the financial system, and the degree of recent structural change, including financial
liberalization. Country experience suggests that simple tools, such as limits on risk exposures or total
asset growth, may be preferable if the quality of financial information is weak, the capacity of the
supervisory authority stretched, and the risk management capacity of banks limited. To be sure, limits
will only be effective if penalties are enforced in case of violation.
Country experience also suggests limiting entry to allow an undercapitalized (domestic) banking
system to recapitalize itself on a flow basis is fraught with many risks.  In general, if banks are
protected from depositor withdrawals (under an unlimited deposit guarantee) and their capital is close
to zero, they will have incentives to gamble by investing in high risk assets as any losses will be
covered (ultimately) by the taxpayer while the bank will get the upside.  In a closed environment,  these
incentives  to gamble can be greater as depositors have less choice to invest their savings and banks do
not feel pressure from other banks. 17 More generally, it risks perpetuating a closed financial system,
with associated costs.1 8 While entry needs can not be free-and  all countries maintain some limits-it
would be best to set a firm time-table on opening up the system, made binding through domestic laws
and regulations and possibly backed up through the WTO process for foreign banks.  This would
create a credible threat of entry for the existing banks in the system and leave no room for political
wrangling.
3.  Evidence  on Competitiveness  and Effects of Consolidation
Competition in the financial sector matters for static and dynamic efficiency. Empirical evidence
indicates that x-inefficiencies (that is, inefficiencies due to poor use of inputs) in banking institutions
are large (and actually dominate concerns over too large or too small financial institutions from an
economies of scale point of view).  This indicates that measures which induce financial institutions to
17 Moreover,  a flow  solution  can  only  work  if bank  spreads  can  be increased  to such  an extent  that  banks  have  a good  chance  of regaining
positive  economic  solvency  in a relatively  short  period  of time. But allowing  spreads  to widen  runs the risk of increasing  real lending
rates to a level where even good borrowers begin to fail.  If instead the burden is passed on primarily to depositors, in the form of lower
negative  deposit  rates,  there is danger  of systemic  disintermediation.  Worse,  overall  bank efficiency  can suffer  where  high  spreads  are
allowed, since the rent from high spreads can easily be consumed through higher operating costs instead of being used to charge off bad
debts and build up capital
18 If the economy indeed recovers, profitability for existing banks will rise and pressures will arise not to open up.  If a quick economic
recovery cannot be achieved, banks that have relied on the government safety net to stay afloat will strongly argue against entry as that
may adversely affect their profitability and solvency. Either way, existing banks will resist opening up, which, given the often prevailing
political economy, is likely successful.15
act efficiently from  a  cost  point  of view  are essential, important among which  is the threat of
competition.
In the  US, allowing interstate branching enhanced competition, lowered costs and increased
stability (Jayanathe and Strahan 1998).  Studies on the effect of the European Union Single-Market
Program (SMP - which harmonized entry and other regulations) on competition, shovved  that the SMP
led to greater competition, both within the banking system, and through greater competition from other
financial services  providers,  inside  and  outside the  country  (Gardener, et  al.,  1999). Financial
innovation increased throughout EU-countries.
Increased competition and greater consolidation need not be inconsistent. Empirical evidence for
the  US,  where  a  great  number  of  bank  mergers took  place  in  the  last  decade,  suggests that
consolidation in the banking industry does not necessarily result in a reduction in comapetition  (Berger,
Demsetz, Strahan 1999). Studies indicate that the  general trend towards consolidation in  the US
banking system in the last decade has been associated with improvements in profit efficiency, and
diversification of risk (but so far little or no cost efficiency improvements; see Berger, et al 1999).
The US evidence might be considered less relevant for other countries as the US banking system was
characterized by  many  small  banks  (largely  due  to  regulations)  and  a  different  institutional
environment.
Evidence for some other countries confirms these results, however.  The ELU  SMP saw both
considerable consolidation within countries as well as  increased competition. The SMP acted to
enhance domestic financial reform efforts and was associated with both liberalization and re-regulation
efforts (see Gardener 1999 and Vives 1999). The latter took the form of tighter capital adequacy and
other prudential requirements, and more emphasis on supervision.
Reduced access to services as a result of consolidation  has been another concern. Empirical work
on the effects of bank consolidation on lending to small business is still in its early stages. Strahan and
Weston (1998) find that given the existing pattern of mergers (i.e., mergers of the smallest banks), on
average small business lending rises after a merger. Peek and Rosengreen (1998) find that the effect of
a  merger  on  lending  may  depend on  the relative  proportions of  small  business lending at  the
constituent banks which are combining. Berger et al. (1997) find that the static effects of consolidation
which reduce small business lending are mostly offset by the reactions of other banks in the market,
and in some cases also by refocusing efforts of the consolidating institutions themselves. It is not clear
whether these results apply to  emerging market economies as their institutional setting, laws and
regulations differ considerably from those of developed economies.16
Table 3:  Competition
Countries  Concentration  Minimum  Capital  Economic  Needs  Test  Openness  to  Openness  to  Share  of number  qf  Share  of Foreign
Ratio  Requirement  Jor  New License  Foreign  Foreign  Foreign  Banks  to  Banks'assets  as
(Share  of 3 largest  (Convenience  and needs  Competition  Competition  in  total Banking  percentage  of total
banks  in banking  of community  test)  (WT0)1
9 Practice20  System  (end  1997)  Banking  System
assets  (end  1997)
G 10 Countries
Germany  35.2%  Universal banks:  No  0.6  NA  30.3%  17.5%
US $ 5.6 million
(Euro 5 million)
Japan  16.0%  US$ 8.7 million  Yes  0.8  NA  1.8%  0.4%
(Yen I billion)
United Kingdom  34.9%  US $ 5.6 million  No  0.6  NA  35.1%  13.0%
(Euro 5 million)
United States  19.7%  NA  Yes  0.6  NA  9.0%  3.1%
Latin America
Argentina  30.9%  US $ 15 million  NA  0.8  NA  25.3%  19.4%
Chile  27.8%  US $ 23.5 million  NA  0.2  NA  35.3%  12.3%
Mexico  37.8%  US $ 16 million  NA  0.4  NA  21.2%  6.9%
(Ps 160 million)
Asia & Pacific
Hong Kong  55.2%  US $ 19.5 million  NA  0.6  4.58  29.5%  48.1%
(HK $ 150 million)
India  38.0%  Universal banks:  No  0  2.18  17.2%  3.5%
US $ 23.5 million
(Rp I billion)
Indonesia  35.2%  NA  0.6  3.10  42.9%  23.3%
Korea  16.3%  US $ 85 million  Yes  0.4  1.90  10.4%  11.7%
(Won 100 billion)
Malaysia  27.6%  NA  0.6  2.45  18.0%  23.0%
Philippines  33.4%  Universal banks:  NA  0.2  2.88  17.5%  36.8%
US$ 115 million
(P 4.5 billion) 21
Thailand  46.8%  US $ 270 million  NA  0.2  2.43  22.2%  10.6%
(Baht I billion)
Source: World Bank data, unless otherwise indicated.
'9 Source: Qian, Ying (1999). Scale: 0 to I with I most open.
20 Scale: I most closed, 5 most open. Index is average of banking and securities indices of degree of openness, in practice.
21 Under discussion.17
4.  The Specific Benefits and Costs of Foreign Entry
Openness  to  foreign  entry  is  an  important  element  in  determining the  degree  of
contestability in the financial system (Levine 1996 and Claessens and Glaessner, 1998).  Entry
policies for foreign financial institutions are determined by a variety of domestic regulations,
some of which can be bound in international agreements such as the WTO Financial Services
Agreement of December 1997. Table 3 presents a comparison of the degree to which some key
countries have committed themselves under the Financial Services Agreement to  permitting
foreign commercial presence in  the banking system and insurance sector (see further Qian,
1999). On this index (ranging from closed, 0, to 1, completely open), Japan and Argentina score
the highest, 0.8, followed by Germany, US, and the UK.  At the lower end of the spectrum are
Chile, the Philippines and Thailand with a score of 0.2.
While liberal entry to foreign banks potentially lowers the franchise value of (domestic)
banking  institutions,  empirical  evidence suggests that  foreign entry can  provide important
benefits to the domestic banking system. A study of 2,000 banks (of which 500 foreign) in 80
countries shows that larger ownership share of the banking system is associated with reduced
profitability and lower overall expenses of domestically-owned banks (Claessens, Demirguc-
Kunt, Huizinga 1998). These results suggest that foreign bank entry improve the fimctioning of
national banking markets, with positive welfare implications for banking customers.  Openness
to  foreign  competition  also  puts  additional pressure  on  domestic  firms  to  improve their
productivity and services, and allows firms access to foreign technologies and ideas to help them
raise efficiency. 22 Argentina, Colombia, Hungary, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and  others both
opened up internationally and deregulated rapidly domestically, and reaped substantial gains. 23
Moreover, cross-country experience indicates that increased foreign entry can bolster the
framework for financial services provision: entry creates a constituency for improved regulation
and supervision, better disclosure rules, and improvements in the framework for the provision of
financial services.  Openness also adds to the credibility of rules.  EU-acceding countries, for
example, consolidated their reform efforts and quickly aligned their regulatory regimes with
those of the EU and other international best practice, while opening up to foreign entry (see
Pastor, 1999 for the case of Spain).
Opening up to foreign competition need not imply that foreign banks will dominate. In the
EU after the opening up of the systems to foreign competition, cross-border banking mergers and
acquisitions were limited and the share of assets held by foreign-owned banks has not exceeded
more than  15%-20% in  many countries (Gardener et  al.  1999.)  And  opening to  foreign
competition need not be complete to reap some of the benefits of foreign competition. Empirical
work shows that it is the number of entrants which matters rather than their market share.  This
indicates that foreign banks affect local bank competition upon entry rather than after they have
gained substantial market share.
Finally, from a  stability point of view, it would be prudent to assure that there is sufficient
diversity among foreign financial institutions in terms of their country of origin to avoid the risks
22 However, it should also be noted that there have also been cases of "bad" foreign bank entry, for example,  the Bank of Credit
and Commerce International, and Meridian banks.
23 For reviews of the Argentine, Colombian, Greece and Portugal country experiences: see respectively Clarke, Cull, D'Amato
(1999); Honahan (1999); and Steiner, Barajas, Salazar (1999).18
of a shock to single home country affecting many foreign branches, including those operating in
International Banking Facilities, in the country. 24
5.  Licensing Process
The  degree  and  ease  of  entry  is  determined  by,  among  others,  minimum  capital
requirements (in absolute numbers); limits on (foreign) ownership; fit and proper test of owners
and managers; limits on the scope of permissible operations (e.g., limits on products); and other
requirements. Some countries use economic needs test, but these do raise issues of transparency
and can violate international agreements.
Licensing Process.  Regardless of how entry criteria are defined, the licensing process of
entry should be transparent.  Many countries go as far as to publish their criteria/process for new
bank applications. In any case, decisions made should be properly motivated and documented.
Minimum capital requirements. When using the minimum level of capital as a tool, it is
important to  explicitly  consider  the  economies  of  financial  intermediation, especially  for
specialized financial services (e.g., brokerage), but also for banks.  Too high capital requirements
can unnecessarily limit the number of economically viable financial institutions, which in tun
will limit the (threat) of entry, with adverse effects on competition and efficiency. 25 Currently,
minimum capital requirements in the EU are US $ 5.6 million (Euro 5 million), in Italy US $ 7
million (Euro 6.3 million), in Germany US $ 5.6 million (Euro 5 million) and in Hongkong US $
19.5 million (HK$ 150 million) (see Table 3).
Fit and Proper Test of Owners.  Those who own equity in a bank need to have both the
ability and the incentives to monitor the actions of their bank.  Small shareholders, however, will
tend to free-ride, so it is important that there are some large stakeholders, or strategic investors,
who will take and bear the responsibility for running the bank.  It is essential, of course that the
identity of these owners be fully transparent to the market place and that these investors do not
face any conflicts of  interest.  The quality of these strategic investors needs to  be assured,
especially if it leads to close links between banking and commerce.
Links between Financial and Non-financial Institutions. An aspect often associated with
universal banking is the ownership of non-financial institutions by financial institutions.  Links
between financial institutions  and non-financial corporations can have  advantages, but  also
create problems. Ownership by financial institutions of non-financial institutions can enhance
relationship banking, which can overcome some asymrnetric information problems (see Allen
and Gale, 1994 and Aoki 1994). They can however, also lead to conflicts of interest, non-market
based lending, and other problems. Extensive ownership of banks and other financial institutions
by a limited number of corporations is often not successful, and so-called financial industrial
groups are prone to a variety of problems.
24 This happened in Thailand when local branches of Japanese banks which were adversely affected at home reduced the supply
of funds to Thai corporations. See also Peek and Rosengreen, 1998 for Japanese Banks in the U.S.
25  The preferable minimum level capital also depends on the organization of  financial services provision:  where financial
conglomerates are allowed, for example, there can be less than optimal supply of some financial services as economies of scope
can prevent the emergence of independent suppliers of these services (there can also be over-supply if financial conglomerates
cross-subsidize certain financial services).  Allowing entry by international, specialized financial institutions can remedy this as
they may be able to gain their economies of scale and scope from their operations outside the host country.19
As a result, while most countries allow banks to own non-financial companies (only 9
countries out of 51 industrialized and emerging market economies surveyed by the Institute of
International Bankers do not allow any investments), they stipulate some limits--related  to the
capital of the financial institution-and  many require supervisory consultations to limit perverse
incentives and assure risk diversification.
Many of the problems associated with ownership of financial institutions by corporations
and  other links  arise however,  from  a  lack of  competition in  the  financial sector, lack of
supervision, or generally distorted real  or financial sectors. Examples include the  financial
conglomerates in  Chile  and  other  Latin  American  countries in  the  late  1970s/earlyl980s;
financial industrial groups in Russia; and the merchant banks in Korea which were owned by
chaebols but  weakly supervised.  Many countries have then also no  or  few restrictions on
ownership  of  financial  institutions  by  non-financial  firms-apart  frorn  supervisory
review/approval-as  they have competitive financial systems and good market and supervisory
oversight.  Others  do  but  find these  restrictions tricky to  enforce.  Yet  in  countries with
concentrated ownership structures, it may be warranted to break ownership links between non-
financial corporates and financial institutions to curb connected lending more effectively (i. e.
minimize the  risk  that  non-financial companies use their  financial subsidiary as  financing
mechanisms) and introduce a paradigm shift.20
Table 4: Overview of Instruments to Manage the Trade-off Between Competition, Safety and Other Considerations in Banking
Instruments  to Manage  Competition 26 Effect  on  Level  of Competition!  Effect on  Safety  and  Soundness  Empirical  Evidence/Comments
Contestability  Considerations
Entry  policy:  *  Too  high  capital  requirements  can  *  As number  of banks  is reduced  *  In designing  minimum  capital  requirements
Capital  requirements  limit  the number  of viable  financial  franchise  value  of banks  economies  of scale  are of importance;
institutions  with  adverse  effects  on  increases.  *  Cross-country  experience  suggest  that using
competition  and efficiency.  limitation  to permit  an under-capitalized
banking  system  to recapitalize  itself  on a
flow  basis  is fraught  with  problems.
Fit and  Proper  Tests  *  If it  is used  to ensure  that strategic  *  If  used to prevent  entry,  then  *  Important  to ensure  that owners  are able  to
owners  of banks  have  the ability  to  franchise  value  of banks  manage  a bank
manage  the bank,  it has no adverse  increases,
effect  on the level  of competition.
*  If it is used  to prevent  entry,  it  can
have  adverse  effects  on competition
and efficiency.
Allowing  Non-Financial  Firms  to Hold  a  If it leads  to non-market  based  *  If it leads  to conflicts  of interest  *  International  experience  suggests  that
Financial  Firms  lending  than  efficiency  of system  and non-market  based  lending  financial  industrial  group  structures  are
adversely  affected.  than it  increases  the risk of  fraught  with  problems  and often  lead  to
failure.  inefficiencies  and safety  and soundness
problems  in the banking  sector.
*  Can  have  positive  effects  on  *  Will  potentially  adversely  *  Empirical  evidence  suggests  that foreign
Foreign  Entry  competition  and efficiency  of  affect  domestic  banks  franchise  competition  puts  additional  pressure  on
financial  institutions.  value.  domestic  firms  to improve  their
productivity  and services  and allows  access
to foreign  technologies.
Others:  *  Higher  C/A  requirements  will  have  *  Higher  C/A  requirements  will  *  Higher  C/A  requirements  than  those
Capital  Adequacy  Requirements  adverse  effects  on competition  as  have  positive  effects  on bank  recommended  under  the BIS  guidelines
they increase  the cost of banking.  soundness  as owners  have  may  be warranted  in countries  with  more
higher  incentive  to act  volatile  macro-economies  and vulnerable  to
prudently  since  they  have  more  external  shocks.
to lose.  *  But, in the end,  the key is responsible
owners  and market  discipline.
26 For  further  discussion  see  Honohan  and Stiglitz  1999.21
Instruments  to Manage Competition 27 Effect  on Level  of Competition!  Effect  on Safety  and  Soundness  Empirical  Evidence/Comments
Contestability  Considerations
Ceilings on Deposit Rates  *  Adverse effect on competition.  *  Increases franchise value of  *  May be warranted in countries where the
financial institutions and thus  supervisory and regulatory framework is
provides them with increased  weak and banks are thinly capitalized and
incentives to act prudently.  have weak management capacity.
*  Adverse effects on competition.  *  Increases franchise value of  *  May be warranted in countries where the
Limits on Portfolio composition/  financial institutions and thus  supervisory and regulatory framework is
Lending Activities  provides them with increased  weak and banks are thinly capitalized and
incentives to act prudently.  have weak management capacity.
*  Consolidation in the banking  *  Can enhance financial sector  *  Empirical evidence in the US and the
Other Considerations:  industry does not necessarily result  stability as large financial  European Community suggests that
Consolidation  in a reduction in competition.  institutions can better diversify  consolidation in the banking industry
*  But, risks leading to banks "too  enhanced competition.
big to fail"
*  May lead to risk diversification  *  Cross-country experience and theoretical
Permitting Financial Institutions to  which would provide banks  work indicate that links between the non-
Hold Equity Position in Non-financial  with a more stable income  financial sector and the financial sector may
Firms  stream resulting in an increase  enhance relationship banking as it can
in franchise value.  overcome asymmetric information
problems.
27 For further discussion see Honohan and Stiglitz 1999.22
IV.  The Safety Net and Supervision 28
The safety net-defimed broadly-has  a bearing on the size and frequency  of financial
crises,  the efficiency  of institutions  and general  financial  development.  The design  of the safety
net relates to its necessary complement,  i.e., supervision. The literature  on safety nets for
developing  countries  (including  Kane (1999);  Brock (1998); Garber  (1997); Calomiris  (1996);
and Mishkin  1996)  has focussed  on the following  issues:
*  What are  the main  motivations  for the safety  net?
*  What  are the main components  of a safety  net?
*  What are  the tradeoffs  between  the scope  of a safety  net and the effects  of financial  sector
efficiency  and incentives?
*  What is the best design  of a safety  net, particularly  regarding  deposit  insurance?
*  What are essential prerequisites  for effective supervision and how these can best be
achieved?
*  What are the supervisory  issues arising from multiple financial services being provided
through  a financial  conglomerate  versus  separate  entities?
1.  Introduction
There are two main motivations  for a safety  net: (i) systemic  consequences  of a run on one
or more  banks;  and (ii) protection  of depositors  against  the failure  of individual  banks.
The systemic  consequences'  motivation  arise as banks are considered  to be special  in two
ways. First,  they provide  credit  to other  firms and  manage  the flow of payments  throughout  the
economy. Disruptions  in the credit supply  and a breakdown  of the payment  system  may have
large spillover  effects for the rest of the economy. Bank  failures  or losses  in capital  can lead to
contractions  in aggregate  bank credit with large social costs to bank borrowers  outside the
banking  system. Second,  banks are especially  prone  to failure  due to their  high leverage,  short-
term funding  structure  and the fact that the value of their assets is difficult  to discern. This
information  problem coupled with banks' demandable  debt and sequential  servicing  feature
(Calomiris  and Kahn) (depositor  withdrawals  are serviced  on a first come  first serve  basis and
not on a pro rata basis), makes  banking  inherently  fragile  and susceptible  to runs (Diamond  and
Dybvig 19830 where depositors overreact to  information  and withdraw funds even from
(solvent) banks.  Thus, small shocks to solvency may lead to costly systemic runs, where
depositors  possibly  overreact  to information  and force  the closure  of solvent  institutions.
The protection of  small depositors' motivation arises because the  combination  of
asymmetric  information  and limited  liability  structures  creates  room for the abuse  of depositors
by bank shareholders  and managers. As small  depositors  lack the ability  to monitor  at low costs,
bank supervisors,  as the representatives  of (small) depositors,  will aim to prevent failure of
individual  financial  institutions,  which  involves  the use of the safety  net.
The two main mechanisms  by which  authorities  try to deal with these concerns  are lender
of last resort and deposit insurance  facilities (besides  the general regulatory  and supervisory
framnework).  Lender  of last resort  facilities  are aimed  at providing  (solvent)  banks  that face  rapid
2
S The following section draws heavily on Demirguc-Kunt, 1999; Demirguc-Kunt  and Kane 1997; and Scott 1994 and 1995.23
deposit withdrawal with the necessary liquidity.  Deposit insurance is often put in  place to
mitigate the runs on (solvent) banks in times of a systemic bank uncertainty and bank failures
and in that way protect (small) depositors (Diamond and Dybvig). Note that historically, deposit
insurance was not often used as small depositors were often already protected from runs on
commercial banks as they kept their savings in specialized financial institutions such as savings
banks, postal banks, etc, which did not have the same liquidity risks.
These two motivations have very different implications for the need and design of an
official safety net.  Empirical evidence suggests-for  example, during the banking panic in
Chicago 1932 and recent financial turbulence in Mexico, Argentina and Chile--that  banks and
depositors are very able to distinguish weaker from stronger banks (Calomiris anLd  Mason 1997,
and Soledad and Schmukler, 1999). They will, in time of financial stress, provide liquidity only
to the stronger ones, thus mitigating the need for official support on the basis of concerns about
systemic consequences.  Many now developed countries also did not have a safety net in the
past.  They relied,  among others, on measures such as unlimited liability (Scotland), double
liability (US) and market disciplining.  As households and business were not protected from
losses, they required banks to have high capital to asset ratios (capital to asset ratios in US banks
were  typically  about  20  percent  in  the  early  1900s).  The  general  emphasis on  systemic
consequences might thus be overdone. In principle, countries need to ask whether there is a need
for a  large safety-net to  begin with  as it leads financial institutions to  act imprudently and
allocate resources inefficiently.
Regardless of its size, the existence of explicit and/or implicit deposit insurance tends to
weaken market discipline over banks by weakening incentives of depositors and creditors to
monitor banks'  behavior.  The costs are multiple: a subsidy to the owners of weak banks-as
they can continue to attract deposits even when the bank is undercapitalized;  reduced incentives
for bank managers to limit costs and be efficient; and poor resources allocation as bank owners
and managers will have incentives to invest in riskier projects. Examples are plentifuil-from  the
S&L crisis in the US to the recent financial crisis in East Asian countries-where  large, implicit
(or explicit) government guarantees induced excessive risk-taking, and poor resource allocation.
2.  The Main Components of a Safety Net and the Tradeoffs in the Scope of a Safety Net
The safety net generally consists of all or some of the following components: lender of last
resort facilities, deposit insurance, access to payment systems, regulatory norms, supervisory
policies and practices, intervention rules, insolvency-resolution policies and mechanisms, and
implicit protection (e.g., through restrictions on competition).  Safety nets tend to differ on the
specific  design  of  each  element,  the weight given to  each  element within the  whole, the
interaction between elements, and the institutional arrangements that sustain them.
The key objective of designing a safety net is to design it in such a way that its use is
minimized, as  that will  also  minimize costs for  the tax payers and  consumers of financial
services.  Since it is  the overall safety net which determines the tradeoff between assuring
safety/soundness and fostering efficient allocation of resources, multiple policies need to  be
employed.  A well-finctioning  regulatory system for example will help minimize regulatory24
forbearance, 29 reduce undue risk taking by banks, and foster sound banking practices, and in that
way promote systemic solvency and stability at minimum costs (loss of efficiency).  Since the
expectation  of  ex-post  recapitalization using  government resources has  been  an  important
element of safety nets inducing imprudent behavior, another aspect is that bank restructuring
needs  to  involve  adequate  burden  sharing,  in  particular  losses  need  to  be  absorbed  by
shareholders and large creditors first. 30
Other  aspects  of  the  safety net matter too  for  proper  incentives.  Access to  deposit
insurance, the payments system and lender of last resort facilities, for example, is often too wide
and entails implicit subsidies. The lender of last resort function should be used only to alleviate
short-term liquidity by lending at a penalty rate on good collateral. In most countries, access to
these facilities is formally limited to regulated depository institutions, and only some countries
allow access by non-bank financial institutions. Yet a number of countries have extended access
to these facilities also to other financial institutions with little economic  rationale and at very low
costs.  A better, institutionally isolation of these functions to deposit-taking financial institutions
is thus necessary. This is especially the case when information regarding the quality of financial
institutions'  portfolios  and  capital  adequacy  positions  is  weak;  and  monitoring  by  the
market-other  financial institutions, creditors and depositors-is  limited. In such cases, the risks
that any liquidity support becomes solvency support is large, and the authorities better refrain
from providing any support.
3.  The Design of Deposit Insurance as Part of the Safety Net
As deposit insurance is often the most explicit part of the safety net, it is most susceptible
to negative costs.  There are complementary actions, however, that can reduce the negative side-
effects  of  a  government-operated, deposit  insurance scheme:  (i)  the  requirement to  issue
subordinated debt at regular intervals; (ii) private coinsurance requiring depositors to cover part
of the losses if a bank fails; (iii) stock-holder bonding (effectively assuring liability of owners
beyond that of their direct equity stake); (iv) narrow banking (deposit insurance is only provided
to deposits that are invested in "relatively safe" money market securities); (v) capital adequacy
requirements which vary by the degree of risk the financial institution undertakes; and (vi) a
formally laid down framework for prompt corrective actions in weak banks. The exact efficiency
and  best  blends  of  these  instruments will  vary  by  country  depending, among  others,  on
informational  asymmetries,  difficulty  in  enforcing  contracts,  political  and  other  costs  of
regulators to enforce deposit insurance coverage limits at times of stress, and the nature of the
"contract" between regulators and tax-payers.  Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) provide
some empirical evidence of the effects of different financial safety net design features on market
discipline; they  find  that  explicit deposit insurance with  higher coverage, and  government
funding reduce market discipline.
Regardless, institutional  arrangements will  be  important in  determining the relative
costs/benefits of a safety net.  Of particular importance here are (i) independence of supervisors,
(ii) information-sharing among regulators, (iii) information disclosure to the market, (iv) market-
discipline, (v) corporate govemance of financial institutions, (vi) prompt corrective action and
29 Supervisors that engage in regulatory forbearance do not apply appropriate disciplinary actions against financial institutions
which violate prudential norms in place.
30 Exit of weak banks is generally to be encouraged, but authorities need to use this tool carefully in times of systemic crisis; it
may well be that the more it is used in normal times, the fewer will be the systemic crises.25
(vi) appropriate funding. 31 To limit costs, the deposit insurance agency needs to have access to
supervisory information  on  a  timely  basis and  the  powers to  intervene in  weak  financial
institutions.  Thus, the deposit insurance agency needs to be able to invoke sanctions prior to the
financial institution running into irreparable insolvency problems. Under the US Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), the intensity of supervision is linked to the
level of capitalization of the banks. FDICIA stipulates a ladder of graduated responses dependent
on the capital ratios of a banking organization. If the capital base of the institution falls below 10
percent, but is, above 8 percent, banks can only accept brokered deposits with FDIC approval. If
capital falls below 8 percent, but is above six percent, supervisors have to impose the following
sanctions/measures: suspension of dividends and management, require capital restoration plan,
restrict asset growth, require approval from FDIC for acquisitions, branching and new activities
and no brokered deposits. Finally, access to the deposit insurance should in all cases be limited to
deposit-taking financial institutions as only the failure of those institutions may have systemic
implication in certain situations.
There  are  many  design-features of  deposit insurance  which  are  essential, but  also
country-specific.  Some countries, e.g., Germany, have a deposit insurance scheme which is
voluntary and privately-run. Private risk sharing arrangements, however, only work, if members
can monitor each other and eject those members that jeopardize the provision of sufficient
collective protection.  If a private  insurance scheme insures all banks in the system, and if
insolvent banks  are not  ejected from  coalitions that provide liquidity protection for solvent
banks, the system cannot be credible in limiting moral hazard. Others, e.g., the Netherlands, have
a collective guarantee mechanisms which is compulsory. In the United States prior to the Civil
War, three states (Indiana, Ohio, and Iowa) successfully operated mutual insuranlce  systems for
member banks.  These were later imitated by the New York Clearing House, and by other private
clearing houses. Member banks were constrained by rules and credible monitoring arrangements
that limited the riskiness of their debts. Enforceable rules requiring the pooling of risks during
crises to  solve liquidity problems ensured sufficient collective protection.  The most effective
element of the systems was that insolvent banks were ejected from the coalitions ex-post. All
successful historical safety net systems revolved around credible arrangements for limiting moral
hazard by  clearly defining how  losses incurred by  members would be  allocated and  how
violators would be punished.
Empirical evidence furthermore indicates that the adoption of deposit insurance in a crisis
is unlikely to lead to increases in financial depth or other gains (Cull, 1998). Overall uncertainty
tends to dominate during a financial crisis and the introduction of a deposit insurance does not
help to reestablish confidence.  On the contrary, there is evidence that introducing a deposit
insurance in a financial crisis is associated with weak design and a further reduction in financial
depth in the three following years.  Adopting it when government credibility is high in contrast
appears to have a positive effect on financial depth.  A better approach might therefore be to
introduce deposit insurance not during a crisis but at a later point in time, with if necessary a
gradual transition from a general guarantee. And, in any case, the deposit insurance would need
to be associated with (increased) powers of the supervisor on insurance agency to intervene in
weak financial institutions, which should be developed beforehand.
31 The creation of deposit schemes with insufficient resources to deal with the problems can be disastrous as it became obvious
during the S&L crisis in the US. If the deposit insurance fund does not have adequate resources to reinmburse  the losses of all
insured depositors, regulatory forbearance instead of prompt corrective action is more likely.  At the sarne time, a well-funded
deposit insurance scheme increases moral hazard as bail-outs are more likely (see Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999).26
4.  The Organization of the Supervisory  Authority and Framework
Independence as the Most Important Prerequisite
The safety net is importantly determined by the regulatory framework which includes the
supervisory authority.  International experience, as embodied in the 25 Core  principles, suggests
that limiting the safety net requires a proper functioning of the supervisory authority, which in
turn needs to be insulated against political pressures.  Independence of the supervisory authority
has in many developing countries been at the core of banking system and other financial crises.
Thus, the supervisor need to reside in  an agency with a high  degree of independence from
political interference.  In most countries, supervision of credit institutions is part of the central
bank, which is normally also the most independent agency.  This arrangement is, however, not
used everywhere.  In about one-third of 70 countries reviewed, supervisory functions of credit
institutions are conducted in  agencies separate from the central bank (See  Annex Table 3).
Securities markets are  generally supervised through  specialized institutions.  Regardless of
institutional arrangement, the independence of the supervisor and its regulatory functions is key
to ensure a proper functioning of the supervisory authority.  And adequate information sharing
between the monetary authority which has access to bank data and the supervisory authority is
necessary.
The Institutional Structure of Supervision ofDifferent Financial Services
The preferred institutional structure for regulation and supervision of different types of
financial services involves an evaluation of many issues.  These include the accountability of
regulatory agencies,  the  direct  costs of  agencies, the  merit  of  a  degree of  competition in
regulation,  costs  imposed  on  regulated  firms  by  multiple  versus  one  regulator, possible
impairment of innovation, regulatory capture, etc.
Countries have responded  differently to  the associated tradeoffs, and  are using a  variety of
institutional structures.  In terms of division of responsibility, for example, out of 70 countries
surveyed by the Institute of International Bankers in 1998,  44 use specialist agencies for banking,
securities markets and insurance, 19 combine two areas and 7 combine all three areas.  Two
criteria seem particularly important in determining institutional supervisory structures: (i) the
objectives of  regulation;  and  (ii) type  of  regulatory  approach adopted  (single or  multiple
regulatory agency).
Regulation has several dimensions and possible objectives: (i) minimize systemic risk, (ii)
prudential, i. e., motivate bank owners and managers to behave soundly and prudently, (iii)
consumer protection, (iv) preservation of integrity of financial markets, and (iv) ensure adequate
franchise value (competition).  These objectives differ by type of financial services and type of
financial institutions.  Securities markets regulators are often mostly concerned with the conduct
of business to preserve the integrity of financial markets-for  wholesale transactions-and  to
assure consumer protection-for  retail transactions.  Competitiveness issues need not be part of
the financial regulator, but could be covered by a competition authority.  Furthermore, many
regulatory aspects are typically the domain of self-regulatory  issues.27
Box 1: The arguments  for and against  a Single  Supervisory  Agency 32
While there is a  growing  number of Single Supervisory  Agency (SSA), SSAs are still the exception,  only
8-Austria, UK,  Denmark,  Sweden,  Norway,  Malta,  Korea,  and  Japan-out of 70 countries  surveyed.  Most  SSA  are
also very  recent and in some recent  cases,  the establishment  of a SSA was in part a response  to various  financial
sector problems,  such as in Korea, and does not necessarily  represent  an independent  development.  The recent
experience  with  SSA  make  it difficult  to  judge their  costs  and benefits.
Nevertheless,  there are good arguments  for a SSA:
*  Blurring of boundaries  in financial  services, with more sophisticated  financial  services and various links
between  capital  markets,  credit  market  and insurance  instruments  and financial  institutions.
*  The associated  emergence  of financial  conglomerates,  spurred  by economies  of scale  and  scope.
. Economies  of scale and scope in regulation  and supervision  and avoidance  of information  sharing and
coordination  problems.
. Establishing  a SSA  can be a way of creating  an institutional  setup  which  is more independent,  professional  and
politically  insulated  than  existing  supervisors.
The above  should  be balanced  against  the following  arguments:
*  The need for supervision  and regulation  arises from different purposes/objectives:  consumer  protection;
competitiveness/anti-trust; safety  and  soundness  (systemic  consequences);  and  underserviced
sectors/consumers. The nature, and methods  of regulation/supervision  are likely  to differ  lby  these purposes,
making  a SSA,  at least on the argument  of economies  of scale  and scope,  less  attractive  to cover all objectives.
A SSA  might create/increase  the impression  that a large  range of financial  institutions  is covered  for systemic
reasons.
*  A SSA may be too difficult  to manage and politically  too powerful  to maintain  its independence.  In other
contexts,  specialization  and competition  between  regulators  has been  advocated  as a means  to avoid  regulatory
capture.
Supervising Financial Conglomerates
Financial conglomerates, defined as  any  group of  companies under  common control
whose exclusive or predominant activities consist of providing financial services in at least two
different  financial  sectors  (banking,  securities,  insurance),  pose  special  challenges to  the
regulatory and supervisory authority. The blurring of lines between institutions with different
primary regulators and supervisors may mean that similar activities are treated differently or that
some  activities of  the  conglomerate remain  unsupervised (supervisory gap).  That  creates
incentives for regulatory arbitrage and can thwart the intent for regulation.  Conglomerates can
also obscure the limits of depositor protection and result in de facto extension of the safety  net to
other classes of financial sector liabilities (see section II). Moreover, the consolidated  position of
a financial conglomerate may not be transparent due to complex intra-group exposures which
may have adverse effect on the health of the banking entity (contagion).  Finally, autonomy of
each entity in the conglomerate may be reduced and conflict of interest increased.
The main objectives of  conglomerate regulation and supervision have therefore been
identified as three-fold (see further Scott, 1994 and 1995): (i) to minimize potential contagion
within the group; (ii) to promote transparent group structures and finances; (iii) to promote the
accountability of directors and managers of individual regulated entities.  The emerging, best
practice approach is the consolidated approach to supervision.  This means that the components
parts of the financial conglomerate are supervised on a separate basis-to  the extent that they fall
32 Taylor and Fleming 1999.28
under regulation-but  a prudential assessment is made from a group-wide perspective to ensure
that problems in a group entity will not harm the banking entity.
Consolidated supervision requires a number of separate ingredients:  Consolidated financial
statements able to adequately capture different financial businesses;  consolidated regulations
(capital adequacy ratio, single credit limits, concentration, etc.) able to capture very different
types  of  risks;  appropriate  control  structure  for  the  conglomerates, power  to  "monitor"
unregulated entities within the conglomerates, exchange of information among supervisors, and
the appointment of a lead supervisor if there are several supervisors.29
Table 5: Components of the Safety Net
Components of the  Key Design Features/lInstitutional  Arrangements  Empirical Evidence/Comments
Safety Net
Lender of Last Resort  *  Limited to liquidity support provided at penalty rates.  *  LLOR functions need to be housed in an agency with a high degree
facility  of independence to avoid liquidity support tuming into solvency
support.
Payment System  *  An inefficient real time gross payment system operated by the government
may turn liquidity support of government into solvency support and expose
government to potentially high contingent liabilities.
Deposit Insurance  *  Deposit insurance can create perverse incentives  that result in increased risk  *  There is empirical evidence that large deposit insurance protection
taking by banks. To minimize moral hazard problem linked to deposit  has intensified financial sector crises (e.g., S & L crisis in the US).
insurance:  Deposit insurance needs to be designed in such a way to limit these
i.  Coverage should be limited to deposit taking institutions and amount  perverse incentives on bank's risk taking and preserve market
covered should be limited to small deposits to preserve market discipline by  discipline for some classes of depositors.
large depositors (generally, coverage should not exceed one to two times  *  Empirical evidence indicates that adoption of deposit insurance
per capita income).  during crisis is unlikely to lead to increase in financial depth.
ii.  Risk premia should be risk sensitive, i.e., be in line with risk exposure of  *  Complementary actions can reduce moral hazard implication
financial institution.  (besides design features) of a govemment operated system:
iii.  Can be operated privately and by the govemment.  i.  Requirement to issue sub-ordinated debt in regular
iv.  Institutional arrangement need to be such that (a) deposit insurance agency  intervals.
is independent agency/organization; (b) separated  from LOLR function,(c)  ii.  Narrow banking.
has access to financial information of insured institutions in a timely  iii.  Coinsurance.
manner; (d) tools to discipline and intervene in institutions  before capital  iv.  Stock holder bonding.
falls below zero.
Regulatory Norms  *  Prudential regulations that limit banks' risk taking for example capital  *  Cross-country experience suggests that deposit rate ceilings can
adequacy, exposure limits, limits on lending to certain sectors (i. e. real  play a role in countries where (implicit or explicit) deposit
estate).  insurance exists but where the supervisory and regulatory
a  Limits on deposit interest rates.  framework is weak and market discipline non-existent as
depositors (correctly or incorrectly) expect to be bailed out in case
of failures.
*  In such a case, weak banks can adversely affect healthy banks by
bidding up deposit rates to attract depositors.
Supervisory Policies/  *  Independent supervisory agency that has the legal means and the capacity to
Enforcement/Exit  enforce the regulatory friamework.
Mechanism  *  Enforcement only credible if supervisory authority has authority and means to
intervene in and ultimately close weak institutions before capital base of bank
has been completely  eroded.30
Components  of the  Key  Design  Features/lnstitutional  Arrangements  Empirical  Evidence/Comments
Safety  Net
Market Discipline  *  Existence  of explicit or implicit deposit insurance scheme weakens market  *  Empirical evidence suggests that even with incomplete information
discipline. Nevertheless,  adverse effects on market discipline can be limited  depositors can distinguish correctly between sound and weak
by  banks and can enforce market discipline by shifting their deposits
*  Exposing certain classes of depositors to losses, and  to the institutions that they perceive as more sound.
*  Implementing  a disclosure regime that require banks to issue in a timely
fashion information on their financial standing and risk exposure to certain
sectors  and off-balance sheet activities,31
V.  The Incentive Framework for Financial Institutions 33
Beyond the basic infrastructure,  the behavior of the  actors in  the financial
system-the providers  ultimate  users  of funds  and the intermediaries-depends crucially
on the incentives  they face. This is in turn influences  financial  institutions' efficiency,
productive  role in the allocation of resources,  impact of growth and overall financial
sector stability. Levine, Loayza, Beck (1999), for example, have recently linked the
broader operating environment of  financial institutions (the legal and  accounting
framework)  to economic  growth  and show  that reforms  in the broader  framework  boost
financial  development  and accelerate  economic  growth.
The following  section  reviews  how the authorities  should  think about installing
and operating a regulatory system that is incentive compatible,  that is, encourages
prudent  behavior,  and which  financial  sector  entities  should  be subject  to that framework.
In particular  it attempts  to answer  the following  questions:
*  What  are the main pillars  of the incentive  framework  in which  financial  institutions
operate  and how can the robustness  of the financial  system  to adverse  shocks  be
increased?
X  To what type  of financial  institutions  should  that  regulatory  framework  be applied
and why?
*  Does  the combination  of commercial  and investment  banking  activities  make it
harder  for market  participants  to monitor  the performance  of financial  institutions?
1.  Introduction
The regulatory and supervisory  framework,  along with accounting  and auditing
rules, disclosure  requirements  and the existence  of a deposit  insurance  scheme,  plays a
crucial  role in defining the incentive  framework  in which financial  institutions  operate.
In particular,  the extent  to which  excessive  risk taking  is curbed  by regulation,  penalized
by the supervisory  authority  as well as by the market greatly influence  the behavior  of
financial  institutions. There are three potential  groups  that can monitor  bank managers,
namnely  the owners,  the market,  and supervisors. What  can the government  do to ensure
that each exerts pressure on managers  to engage in prudent risk taking? In industrial
economies,  authorities  erect some entry barriers; enforce  modest capital requirements,
usually  above the BIS minimum  of 8% (capital  to risk-weighted  assets); irntermediaries
face market discipline  in money and capital  markets,  which usually are uncovered  by
explicit  government  guarantees;  and are supervised  by one or more  government  agencies.
Industrial  country authorities  have tended  to permit bank exit, though banks still have
engaged  in excessive  expansions  that have  caused  systemic  difficulties.
In developing  and transitional  economies,  where  risks are greater  due to the small
and often more concentrated  economies,  where shocks  often are larger and volatility  is
greater, and where the  market's ability to  monitor banks is  hampered by  poor
information,  governments  need to  enhance  the ability and incentives of these three
potential  groups.
33 This section draws heavily on World Bank, 1997.32
2.  The Regulatory and Incentive Framework as a Means to Increase theFinancial
Sector's Resiliency to Adverse Shocks
Incentive Structure of Owners, Creditors and Other Claim-holders
Those who own equity in a bank in principle have both the ability and the incentive
to monitor the actions of their bank.  They tend to provide effective self-regulation when
they have much at risk, either  in the form of capital and/or future expected profits.
Moreover, well capitalized banks are usually better monitored by their  shareholders.
Small shareholders, however, will tend to free-ride, so it is important that government
make sure that there are some large stakeholders, or strategic investors, who will take and
bear the responsibility for running the bank.  Inside and outside investors need to face the
loss of their investment, and they and their managers need to see the possibility of bank
failure, or exit from the industry, to encourage prudent behavior.
Some emerging economies have raised minimum capital ratios above that for most
industrial economies to take into account the riskier environment in which bank operate
and  the difficulty in  measuring the economic net worth of a  bank  using back-ward
looking accounting measures.  In Argentina, for example, the minimum capital adequacy
requirement is 11.5%, with higher requirements for banks engaging in riskier activities
and  weaker risk  management capacity; the  average actual capital adequacy ratio in
Argentina for example was close to 16% in 1997.  Furthermore, banks in Argentina are
subject to  high  liquidity requirements.  Singapore also has  higher  capital adequacy
requirements (12%).  Moreover, most banks  in  countries with  8%  capital adequacy
requirements have capital adequacy ratios which greatly exceed those: the average capital
adequacy ratio in the US, for example, is about 12%.33
Table  6:  Regulatory  Framework
Countries  Level  of  Minimum  Of which  tier  I and  Loan  Classification  Provisioning  Limit  on Risk  Limit  on Risk  Single  Exposure  Limit
Capital  Adequacy  tier  2  Requirements  - requirements  for loans  Exposure:  Exposure:  (%  of capital)
requirements  (C/)  (Number  of Days  classified  as  non-  Liquidity  Ratio  Forex
(percentage  end  after  which  loan  has  performing  ('I of assets  to be  ('Io  offorex assets  to
1998)  Tier  I  Tier2  to be classified  as  Sub  Doubt  Loss  held  against  be held)
NPL)  Stan  ful  deposits)
dard
G 10 Countries
Germany  8%  At bank's  discretion  25% of tier I capital
Japan  8%  4%  4%  At bank's  discretion  a.b.d  50%  100%  No legal  limit  Part of market  risk  20% of tier I capital
United  Kingdom  8%  4%  4%  At bank's  discretion  At bank's  discretion  No legal limit  No limit  25% of tier I capital
United  States  8%  (strongly  4%  4%  90  At bank's  discretion,  3% for deposit  Not a practical  Not secured:  15%  of
recommended  to go  with  input  from  OCC  accounts  deemed  as  concern,  given  capital  and surplus. An
beyond)  net transaction  predominance  of  additional  10%  for  loans
accounts,  0% for all  US$ in  US banking  fully  secured  by readily
other  liabilities  activity  marketable  collateral
Latin  America
Argentina  11.5%  No limit  Not  After  90 days,  25%  50%  100%  20%  on liabilities  Watched  closely  25% of tier I capital
more  considered  problem  up to 89 days,  15%
than  loan.  After 180  days  for  90-179;  10%  for
100%  of  considered  high  risk  180-365;  and 0 for
tier I  /difficult  recovery  over  365 days.
Approx.  9.7%
additional  as Repos.
Mexico  8%  No fixed  ratio.  90 days  for  20%  60%  100%  Liquidity  ratio  15%  in US$  plus  an  10%  of capital  for  a
Subject  to  commercial  loans;  determined  as  additional  2% in any  single  person  and 30%
supervision  of the  180  days  for  percentage  of total  and all other  for corporate
Supervisory  mortgages  bank liabilities  to  currencies  indebtedness.
Authority  (Comision  total  banking
Nacional  Bancaria)  system  liabilities
multiplied  by 12
billion  pesos.  (Aug.
1998).
Chile  8%  5.75%  2.25%  90  20%  60%  90%  9% on demand,  Net open position  5% of capital  and up to
3.6%  on time  must not exceed  20%  25% of capital  in cases
of capital  of creditworthy  bank
guarantees34
Countries  Level of Minimum  Of which tier I and  Loan Classification  Provisioning  Limit on Risk  Limit on Risk  Single Exposure Limit
Capital Adequacy  tier 2  Requirements - requirements  for loans  Exposure:  Exposure:  (% of capital)
requirements  (%)  (Number of Days  classif ed as non-  Liquidity Ratio  Forex
(percentage end  after which loan has  performing  (% of assets to be  (%o  offorex assets to
1998)  Tier I  Tier2  to be classified as  Sub  Doubt  Loss  held against  be held)
NPL)  Stan  ful  deposits)
dard
Asia & Pacific
Hong  Kong  8%  4%  4%  90  At bank's  discretion  25% of liabilities  Watched  closely  by  25%  of capital  base
HKMA
India  8%  No limit  Not  210  10%  20 to  100  Minimum  cash  Not allowed,  must  Individual  loans:  At
more  50%  %  balance  of 11%  of  square  daily.  bank's  discretion.
than  of sec.  time,  demand  Corporate:  25%  of
100%  of  deposits;  statutory  capital  funds.  Group:
tier 1  25%  of time,  50%  of bank's capital
demand  deposits.  funds
Indonesia  8%  4%  4%  90  15%  50%  100  5%  Net open  position  85%
%  less  than 20%  of
capital;  25%
maximum  exposure
limit  for  individual
currency
Korea  8%  No limit  Up  to  180  20%  75%  100  5%  on demand,  2%  20%  of capital  45%  of capital
100%  of  %  on time
tier I
capital
Malaysia  8%  8%  Not  180  No  50%  100  15%  No restrictions
eligible  %
Philippines  10%  10%  Not  180  25%  50%  100  15%  No more  than 15%  25% of capital,  plus
eligible  %  of equity  15%  provided  the loan  is
adequately  secured  by
real  estate  mortgage  or
the assignment  of
readily  marketable
bonds  or other  high
grade  securities
Thailand  8.5%  4.25  4.25%  90  20%  50%  100  6%  Net long  20%  of tier  25%  of tier I capital
%  I capital.  Net short
15%  of tier I capital
Source:  World  Bank  Data.35
Even then, capital adequacy will, by nature, always be a back-ward looking accounting
indicator of the true solvency of the financial institution. Some banks with high measured capital
have become insolvent in  short periods of time 34,  even in economies with  good accounting
standards and practices.  The increased incentives to engage in excessive risk-taking when the
capital adequacy position is  weakened make it  all the more important not just  to  rely on
accounting capital  adequacy  alone.  Countries have applied  one  or more of  the  following
measures (see Table 5 for an overview of prudential regulations across countries): limiting entry
or otherwise raising franchise value (future profitability), which can be collected only by banks
that remain open; enhancing the liability of directors and shareholders, as the New Zealand
authorities have undertaken; and requiring the issuance of sub-ordinated debt.  Some countries
have also enhanced  liability  beyond current capital levels by  applying stiff penalties when
bankers violate regulations or agreements with supervisors as to how they will take and monitor
risks. 35 Developing country authorities need to choose (at least) one of these additional methods
for improving the incentives confronting bank owners to behave prudently. While some of these
methods may be relatively blunt, the costs of not using them can be quite high.
Incentive Structure of Market Participants
Market participants, principally those who enter into a creditor relationship with a bank,
will serve to monitor and discipline it if they have the ability and the incentives.  The ability to
monitor banks depends on the reliability and range of information available.  The starting point
therefore is adequate accounting standards and practices.  Authorities in some countries recently
have put  in  place  extensive disclosure requirements backed up by  enhanced liability (New
Zealand), mandatory ratings by at least two private rating agencies (Chile), and an online credit
reporting system (Argentina).  Beyond information, creditors need incentives to monitor, in the
form of the assurance that they will be allowed to suffer losses.  Although small depositors are
unlikely to be good monitors of banks, large debt holders have a much greater potential to fulfill
this role.  At the very least, large debt holders need to be reminded that they are not covered by
any explicit or implicit deposit insurance scheme.  Mandating that banks periodically issue large
blocks  of  uninsured,  subordinated debt,  as recently instituted in  Argentina, could in  some
circumstances further enhance market monitoring (Calomiris 1997), and also creates a class of
future  bank  owners;  if  the  current  owners fail  in  ensuring  a  safe  and  sound bank,  the
subordinated debt holders can take over the bank.  The incentives of subordinated debt holders
may thus be appropriately balanced.
Incentive Structure of Supervisors
Although owners and markets can be motivated to provide oversight, banks, given their
special nature, also  are subject to government supervision.  Historically, bank supervision in
developing and transitional economies was oriented to ensuring compliance with government
directives on  credit  allocation.  Though  lagging relative  to  other parts  of  financial reform
programs,  authorities  in  most  developing  countries  have  moved  to  engage  in  prudential
supervision.
34 In a world of derivatives, balance sheets can be altered in minutes.
31  In evaluating market risk, recently, supervisors around the world have moved to assessing the quality of the risk management
tools bank use, rather than the actual positions. Banks are then fined if they violate risk management arrangements ex-post.36
Less attention has been devoted to providing supervisors the incentives both to monitor
better and to take actions based on this effort. If there are no incentives to monitor, and thus no
consequences for  banks  for  violating  a  regulatory  framework, then  it  will  be  completely
ineffective.  One way to promote better supervision is to give authorities better incentives.  In
many countries supervisors are paid poorly relative to their counterparts in banks.  At the very
least, low pay makes it difficult to attract qualified personnel, and may negate the effects of even
the best training programs as skilled supervisors move to the banking sector. Moreover, the lure
of eventual high paying jobs leaves open a form of corruption: less rigorous supervision now in
exchange for a lucrative salary later.  This disincentive for effective supervision can only be
reduced by raising supervisory pay reasonably close to private sector limits.
Another approach is to create a 'bonded regulator,' that is paying supervisors a high salary,
with a large part of compensation deferred and held as a bond, out of which deductions could be
taken  depending  on  the  outcome  in  the  banking  sector. 36 Although this  system  worked
successfully in the United States (the Suffolk banking system, 1820s to the 1850), there is no
recent experience to  cite.37  Another complementary policy can be to limit the possibility of
supervisors to switch to the private sector: in the US, for example, bank supervisors above a
certain level can not take a job with the commercial bank they have supervised until a period of
12 months or more after they leave the supervisory agency.
Another model is to tie the hand of supervisors and lay down the course of action to be
followed.  In the context of dealing with weak banks, it has become increasingly common to
recommend that countries adopt the 'prompt, corrective action and structured, early intervention'
approach analogous to that embodied in U.S. legislation.  Structured early intervention calls for
(i)  higher capital;  (ii)  structured, pre-specified, publicly announced responses by regulators
triggered  by  decreases  in  a  bank's  performance (such  as  capital ratios)  below  established
numbers; (iv) mandatory resolution of a capital depleted bank at a pre-specified point when
capital is still positive; and (v) market value accounting and reporting of capital.  While this
approach appears to have yielded promising results in the U.S. so far it is by no means certain
that this model either works at all times or can be exported to other countries.  Even if enacted,
governments may be  tempted to  re-write the rules  in  tough  times, as  in  Japan in  1997-8
(deferring scheduled deregulation) and in the U.S. in the early 1980s (replacing GAAP for S &
Ls  with  less  stringent  accounting standards).  And  opponents of  these  rules  argues  that
authorities  could be hampered by a loss of discretion.
36 Bank officers were also routinely bonded in mid-19'h  century US.
37 See for information on the Suffolk banking system: Rolnik, Smith and Weber (1998) and Calomiris and Kahn 1996.37
Table 7: The Incentive Framework for Financial Institutions
As a Means to Safe and Sound Banking
Tools  Empirical Evidence/Comments
Owners  *  Capital adequacy requirements.  *  As  developing  countries  face  greater
*  Liability, including civil and criminal  (macro)-risk and are more vulnerable to
penalties  for  violations  and  external shocks, countries need tlo go
inadequate governance  beyond  industrialized  countries'
*  Future profitability, franchise value  frameworks. These can be done by:
i.  Raising  c/a  requirements  beyond
those in industrialized countries (i.e.
Argentina uses 11.5%).
ii.  Credible  threat  of  facing  stiff
penalties for violations of regulations.
iii.  Enhancing liabilities of directors and
shareholders (double liability).
Market  *  Requirements  for  fimancial  *  Market participants need incentives to
Participants  institutions to disclose information on  monitor financial institutions.  Thus, to
their financial situation and exposure  preserve market discipline, a group of
to risks.  depositors (i. e.,  large deposit holders
*  Mandatory ratings by rating agencies.  and creditors) needs to credible face the
*  Online credit reporting system.  threat of losses if an institution  fails.
*  Requirements for financial institution
to  issue  in  regular  intervals
subordinated debt.
Supervisors  *  Independent supervisory  agency.  *  To  attract  qualified  personnel  and
*  Prompt  corrective  action  and  ensure  that  supervisors  have  proper
structured  early  intervention  which  incentives  to  monitor  financial
limit  supervisory  discretion  and  is  institutions, their pay scale need to be
aimed  at  establishing clear  criteria  close to  that prevalent  in the  banking
when and how a supervisory agency  industry.  Relative  similar  pay
has  to  react  to  violation  of  the  structures will also  limit the potential
prudential  framework  by  financial  for conflicts of interest from the banks
institutions  and  ensuring  that  supervisors point of view: less rigorous
financial  institutions  are  being  supervision  now  in  exchange  for  a
intervened in before their capital base  lucrative salary later.
is completely depleted.38
Annex Table 1: Permissible Activities for Banking Organizations  in Various Financial Centers
Country  Securities 1 Insurancee  Real  Estate 3 Bank  Investments  in  Industrial  Firm  Investment
:__________________________  :______________________  :_____________________  _  ::  :  Industrial  Firmns4 in B  anks
G-10  countries
Belgium  Permitted  Permitted through  Generally limited to holding  Smigle  qualifying holding may  Permitted, but subject to prior
subsidiaries  bank pre:mises  not exceed 15% of ban'si own  approval of authorities
fuins  and  such  holdings  on an
aggrte  basis  may  not
exceed  45%  of own  funds
Canada  Permitted through subsidiaries  Perrnitted through  Pernitted through  Perrnitted up to 10% interest  Permitted to hold up to 10%
subsidiaries  subsidiaries  in industrial firm  interest
Fae  Permitted  Permitted;  usually through  Permitted  Permitted, but limited to 15%  Not prohibited
subsidiaries  of the bank's  capital;  in the
agegate  limited to 60% of
:_________:___  the bank's capital
Germany  Permitted  Permitted, but only through  Permitted, but subject to  Permitted, but limited to 15%  Permitted, subject to
insurance subsidiaries  limits based on the bank's  of the bank's capital; in the  regulatory consent based on
capital; unlimited through  aggregate limited to 60% of  the suitability of the
subsidiaries  the bank's capital  shareholder
Italy  Permitted  Limited to 10% of own  Generally limited to holding  Permitted, up to 15% of the  Pernitted, up to 15%  :  of sates
funds for eah  insurance  bank premises  bank's capital, subject to  of the bank, subject to the
coXmpany  cand  20%:  approval of the Bank Italy  approval of the Bank of Italy
aggregate  invest  in
insurance companies
Japan  Permitted through  Not permitted 6 Generally limited to holding  Limited to holding 5%  Permitted, provided total
subsidiaries,  but not for equity  bank premises  interest 7 investment does not exceed
securities for the time being 5 investing firm's capital or net
_____________________________assets39
Country  Securities'  Insurance'  Real Estate3 Blank  Investments  in  Industrial  Firm  Investment
Industrial  Firms4 in Banks
Netherlands  Permitted  Permitted through  Permitted  Subject to regulatory approval  Subject to regulatory approval
subsidiaries  for voting shares in excess of  for voting shares in excess of
_________  _  ________  ____  ________  10%  5%
Sweden  Permitted  Pennitted  Generally limited to holding  Limited  Not prohibited, but such
banking premises  investments  are generally not
. _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ._  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  m  ad  e
Switzerland  Permitted through specific  Permitted through  Permitted  Permitted  Not prohibited, but such
license as securities dealer  subsidiaries  investments are generally not
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _  . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __  m  a  d  e
United  Permitted; usually conducted  Permitted through  Pennitted  Pernitted, subject to  No statutory prohibition, but
Kingdom  through subsidiaries  subsidiaries  supervisory consultations  controlling investments by
indusftit  firms in major firms
in major banks are not %ltvored
United States  Permitted corporate securities  Generally not permitted  Generally limited to holding  Permitted to hold up to 5% of  Permitted to make non-
underwriting  and dealing  except for insurance sales  bank premises  voting shares through a  controlling investments up to
activities must be conducted  activities  holding company  25% of the voting shares
through affiliates, which must
limit such activities to 25% of
gross  revenues
Emerging Markets:
Argentina  Permitted  Permitted through pension  Limited; based on bank  Limited  Permitted but subject to prior
fund affiliates  capital  and  investment  approval of authorities
Chile  Permitted  Insurance brokerage  Not permitted  Not pernitted  Permitted, but only up to IO%
permitted  of a bank's shares and the
Superintendent's prior
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ___ . _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ap  proo  aa40
Country  Securities'  Insurance'  Real Estate 3 Bank Investments in  Industrial Firm Investment
Industrial Firms 4 in Banks
Hong Kong  Permitted, subject to limits  Permitted, subject to limits  Permitted, subject to limits  Permitted, subject to limits  Permitted, subject to
based on the capital of the  based on the capital of the  based on the capital of the  based on the capital of the  regulatory consent based on
bank  bank  bank  bank  suitabt  of the shareholder
Indonesia  Permitted through subsidiaries  Permitted through  Not permitted  Not permitted  Permitted
subsidiaries__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Korea  Perrnitted through affiliates  Permitted through affiliates  Generally limited to holding  Subject to prior approval for  Permitted, up to 1  00% of the
bank premises and to 100%  investments in excess of 15%  bank's capital, but subject to
of bank capital  prior approval based on
___________  ____________________  ____________________________  suit  f  the  shareholder
Singapore  Banks  mnay  hold equity  Locally incorporated  banks  Limited in the aggregate to  Limited in the aggregate to  Acquisitions of 5% or moe
participation  in stockbrokering  may own insurance  40% of bank's capital  400%  of the bank's capital  requires regulatory approval
firms with MAS approval  companies  with MAS  (excluding  ses used
approval  for  banking  ess)  _  _L:__  _
The  Permitted;  expanded  Insurance  agency and  Permitted for unibanks  Permitted for unibanks with  Permitted with limitations
Philippines  commercial banks may engage  brokerage permitted for  through subsidiaries  limitations
in securities activities directly  unibanks through
or through a subsidiary;  subsidaries
regular commercial banks may
engage in securities activities
_  through  subsidiaries  only  I
1. Securities activities include underwriting, dealing and brokering  all kinds of securities and all aspects of the mutual fund business.
2. Insurance  activities include underwriting  and selling insurance as principal and as agent.
3. Real estate  activities include real estate investment, development  and management.
4. Including investments  through holding company  structures.
5. Restrictions  on the business of securities subsidiaries will be abolished by March 2000.  Selling of securities investment trusts (mutual funds) by banks was permitted on
December 1, 1997.
6. Banks will be permitted to enter the insurance business through subsidiaries by 2001.  Selling of insurance policies by banks will also be permitted by 2001 with some
restrictions.
7. Bank holding companies and their subsidiaries are allowed to hold in the aggregate up to 15% of the total shares of non-financial companies.
Source: Institute of International Bankers. Regulatory and Market Developments. Global Survey 1998.  New York, September 1998.41
Annex Table 2: Forty-seven Nation Survey of Firewalls* Applicable to Securities Underwriting and Dealing
Activities
Securities Activities  Securities Activities Subject to Firewalls
Permissible Without Firewalls
Securities Activities  Securities Activities
Securities Activities  Permitted Only in a  Permitted Only in a
Permissible in the Bank  Nonbank Affiliate  Nonbank Affiliate
Argentina'  Luxembourg  Bolivia  Czech Republic
Australia  Netherlands  Brazil  Japan 5
Austria  New Zealand  Canada  Korea 6
(Bahrain)  Nigeria  Colombia  Philippines
7
Belgium  Norway  Indonesia
Bermuda  Pakistan  United States 4
Cayman Islands  Peru
Chile  Poland 2
Demnark  Portugal
Estonia  Romania




Hong Kong  Turkey




*These "firewall" restrictions do not include so-called "chinese walls" which restrict the dissemination of
non-public, confidential information between banking and securities operations.
' Trading securities on the exchange limited to stock brokerage subsidiary.
2 Dealing in publicly traded securities limited to subsidiaries.
3Local  banks are encouraged to conduct their nonbank business, whether financial or non-financial,  through
separately incorporated subsidiaries for better control, monitoring and accountability. Banks, however, are
permitted to engage in securities activities directly without firewalls.
4Firewalls  have been removed and replaced by eight "operating standards".
5 There are number of firewalls in Japan, the most significant being that a securities subsidiary is prohibited from
being a lead manager for a company with assets less than 500 billion yen if the bank is or has recently been the
trustee on that or similar issues. In addition, loans by the bank to purchase securities underwritten by the securities
subsidiary are prohibited, tie-in-sales are prohibited, sharing space in the same building is regulated,  joint sales
visitations are restricted (unless requested by the customer) and director and personnel interlocks are restricted.
6 Personnel interlock restrictions.
7Expanded  commercial banks can engage in securities dealing directly and indirectly through a subsidiary,  while
regular commercial banks can engage in securities activities only through a subsidiary.42
Annex Table 3: Regulators of Banking, Securities  and Insurance  Activities
Banking  coSecuries  insuranc
Belgium  Bankin and  securities  regulator  Specialist  insurance  regulator
Cahnad  Bakigaimsnce  eglator  S  aist  urities  re  r  Bankig  and  insurance
__  _  _  __  _  _  _  __  _  _  __  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  :  :u::  D  :  :::  i  :  Et;:  0i.S  di;:0  t:0t  reguator:V 0 
France  Specialist  bank  regulator  Specialist  securities  regulator  Specialist  insurance  regulator
Germany  Specialist  bk  r  t  Secilists:euities  tr  Specialist  insurance  regulator
Ia  Central  bank/monetary  agency  Specialist  securities  regulator  Specialist  insurance  regulator
Japan  Central  bank/monetary  GOver  nen  t de  ent
agenY/GOvernment  department
Netherlands  Central  bank/monetary  agency  Specialist  securities  regulator  S  Secialist insurance  regulator
,Swveden  Combined  X  0  baning0  Cobie  banking  _______.______________::  :  .
Switzerland  Banking  and securities  regulator  Banking  and  securities  Specialist  insurance  regulator
regulator
United  Central  bank/monetary  agency/  Specialist  securities  reg  r  Govemment  department
Kingdom  Specialist bank regulator
United  States  Central  bank/monetary/  Specialist  securities  regulator  Specialist  insurance  regulator
I Specialist bank regulator
Argentina  Central  bank/monetary  agency  Specialist  securities  regulator  Specialist  insurance  regulator
Chile  Specialist bankregulator  S  secrtis  a  i  ereuor 
Hong  Kong  Central  bank/monetary  agency  Specialist  securities  regulator  Specialist  insurance  regulator
Indonesia  g  Centl  a  lbn  ragy  Speciali secities  regulator
Korea  Central  bank/monetary  agency  Specialist  Securities  regulator  Specialist  insurance  regulator
Singapore  Cetrl  ban/oeayaec
Philippines  Central  bank/monetary  gency  Specialist  securities  regulator  Specialist  insurance  regulator
Source:  Financial  Regulation:  Why,  how and  where  now?  Routledge  Publisher  1998.43
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